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FARM POLICY - THE EMERGING AGENDA 
The emerging agenda for the making of U. S. farm policy features three principal topics. 
They are domestic price and income policy, credit policy, and international trade policy. 
All were reviewed at the Harold F. Breimyer Agricultural Policy Seminar held on the campus of 
the University of Missouri-Columbia November 14-15, 1985. The seminar, renamed a year ago, has 
been an annual event since 1973. 
Three themes ran through the discussions of a day and a half. One is that agriculture's 
economic difficulties of 1985 trace more to general economic policies, and to economic conditions 
outside agriculture, even the situation internationally, than to imbalances within agriculture 
itself. 
It logically follows -- the second theme -- that the best hope for improvement lies in better 
general economic policies but above all in economic recovery and resumed economic growth in our 
country and in the countries that buy our exported products. 
Thirdly, U.S. agriculture has become internationalized. 
connection are by no means clear, but the fact is not in dispute. 
The terms of international 
These topics were discussed by the speakers at the seminar, and by the farmers, 
agribusinessmen, and other interested Missourians who attended the seminar. 
The seminar is funded from the Breimyer Seminar Fund, a part of the UMC Development Fund. 
-- Robert J. Bevins 
Turbulent Times for U. S. Agriculture 
Mark Drabenstott 
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TURBULENT TIMES FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE 
Mark Drabenstott 
Research Officer and Economist 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
U.S. agriculture is passing through troubled waters. While the general economy has enjoyed 
three years of strong expansion, the farm sector has had a much more turbulent passage. Financial 
problems of considerable magnitude are spread broadly across the sector--from an increased number 
of farm liquidations, to restructured agribusinesses, to a rising count of farm bank failures. 
Following the benevolent decade of the 1970s, U.S. agriculture finds itself adjusting to a harsh 
new market reality. 
U.S. agriculture enters 1986 with many concerns. Grain bins are full, even overflowi ng, 
while export markets remain in the doldrums. Livestock producers are finishing a very 
disappointing year. Farmland values are 20 to 25 percent below a year ago. Farm lenders are 
under great financial pressure, as agricultural bank failures reach a post-Depression high. 
Rural communities struggle as business failures rise. Agriculture is a worn down industry. 
Meanwhile, the U.S general economy has just completed its third y~ar of economic expansion. 
Growth has been good, overall, and inflation has stayed low. But never before has our econ?my 
grown with the benefits spread so unevenly across industries and regions of the country. ~!h1le 
overall economic growth has been strong by comparison to other postwar recoveries, many important 
sectors--notably agriculture--have not shared fully in the growth. This fundamental imhala~ce 
has led many persons to question how durable the ~xpansion really is. Colorado Governor D1~k 
Lamm recently described the expansion as a "souffle economy." Although I do not support h ~ s 
concerns for a collapsing economy, his suggestion that the growth layer may be fairly th1n 
contains a grain of truth. 
Agriculture faces another difficult year in 1986. In supporting that conclusion, I would 
like to consider four topics. First, I will consider the aeneral economic outlook, arguing that 
international factors will play a critical role in the ~outlook and shaping economic policy. 
Second, I will review recent developments in the farm economy. Third, I will consider the 
current situation for farm 1 enders. Fi na 11 y, I will pose an out 1 ook for farm credit conditions 
in the coming year. 
The General Economy: International Factors 
Put simply, the U.S. economy has been very sluggish in 1985. Real GNP grew only 0.3 percent 
in the first quarter, and growth iw.proved to only a revised 1.9 percent in the second. A sharp 
burst in auto sales boosted growth to 3.3 percent in the third quarter. But taking into account 
the last half of 1984, the economy has stalled during that period and 1985, in sharp contrast 
with the vigorous expansion in 1983 and the first half of 1984. 
Several factors account for the slowing. Consumer demand was relatively strong, but a 
growing portion of final demand was met by imported goods . Another factor in a slowdown in the 
economy was a slowdown in manufacturing. Industrial product i on grew only 1.0 percent during ~he 
12 months beginning in late 1984, well below the rapid advances in 1983 and early 1984. A th~rd 
reason for the slowdown was more sluggish consumer spending. Consumers provided the maJor 
stimulus for the outstanding economic growth in 1983 and early 1984 when they rushed to make 
major purchases that had been postponed in 1981 and 1982. Except for the automobile-buying binge 
in September 1985, consumers clearly have been catching their breath since mid-1984. 
Low inflation has remained the real bright spot in the economy. The GNP deflator--one of 
the broadest measures of price inflation--increased only 3.3 percent from the third quarter of 
1984 to third quarter of 1985. The Consumer Price Index increased nearly the same amount. 
Wholesale prices, as measured by the producer price index, rose less than 1 percent in that year. 
Never before has our economy marched forward with the peculiar combination of policy and 
economic imbalances that we now have. Economic growth has been very unevenly distributed across 
sectors of the economy. Sectors that deoend heavily on exports or that must compete with imports 
have suffered. But sectors that are insulated from the world market, such as services, have 
enjoyed vigorous expansion. 
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The plainest indicator of this trend is our burgeoning trade deficit. In fiscal 1985, our 
current account deficit was estimated to be as much as $140 billion, another new record. To put 
that number in perspective, the deficit was $4? billion in 1983 and $102 billion in 1984. Thus, 
the United States is building up IOUs with the rest of the world at a rate that would have been 
unthinkable only a few short years ago. 
The $140 billion inflow of foreign capital is both good and bad. It is good because it 
means that foreigners are willing to finance about two-thirds of our federal budget deficit. It 
also means that U.S. interest rates are lower than they otherwise would be. But the inflow is 
bad in that it means that an ever larger amount of our national income will have to be used in 
future years to service the debts we are accumulating. Thus, less money will be· available to 
invest and enhance the productivity of our economy. And when 1-1e recognize how critical it will 
be to invest prudently and compete effectively in an international market for goods and services, 
the looming current account deficits appear rather o~inous. 
Another international consideration is the health of the world economy. If the United 
States has a "souffle economy," then the world may be doing \lolell to have scrambled eggs. 
Economic growth in the developing world, and particularly in middle-income countries, is vital to 
recovery in U.S agricultural exports. Many of these countries simply have not bounced back from 
economic and financial distress. To give an example, less developed countries averaged 4.8 
percent growth in real GNP from 1977 to 1980, but have managed only 2.0 percent since then. 
~Jhile we can assail the EC and others for unfair trade practices, the reality is that U.S farm 
exports will expand only when the low- and middle-income countries return to more rapid economic 
growth. 
Hand in hand with these international factors is domestic economic policy. The United 
States continues to operate with a rather peculiar mix of economic policy. Fiscal policy remains 
expansionary, with the federal budget deficit expected to exceed $210 billion this fiscal year. 
With the economy growing more slowly than expected, the deficit could 1t1iden even further. 
Technically, fiscal policy will not be stimulative in 1986 because the deficit is expected to 
decline. If the forecast of the Congressional Budget Office, of $175 billion, is correct, fiscal 
policy will actually be slightly contractionary. Nevertheless, the projected deficits remain 
very 1 arge, and importantly, the prospect of those deficits wi 11 serve to keep rea 1 interest 
rates high in financial markets. 
Meanwhile, mor.etary policy has noticeably eased in the past year. M1 has grown fairly 
rapidly in 1985. The Federal Reserve rebased Ml in May in reaction to market developments early 
in the year. Since then, Ml has continued to grow at a rapid pace, and as of late 1985 the 
aggregate is above the upper limit of its 3 to 8 percent long-run growth rate range for 1985, as 
depicted by the traditional cone, and also above the upper bound of the parallel band. 
This rapid growth in M1 must be put in perspective. Recent monetary growth does not 
correlate well with either real economic growth or recent trends in inflation. Thus, one might 
ask if the traditional relationship between Ml and the economy has changed. My own assessment is 
that it has. With the rapid innovations we have seen in financial markets in recent years, I 
believe that we are much less able to explain the behavior of monetary aggregates. Thus, I 
conclude that recent rapid growth in Ml is not as alarming as it at first appears. 
On balance, the economy will be shown to have grown more rapidly in the second half of 1985 
than earlier, but the growth rate will remain moderate. The Blue Chip consensus forecast was 3.0 
to 3. 5 percent growth in rea 1 G~:p in the second ha 1 f of 1985. Although consumers may have 
responded to 1 o~Jer interest rates with a spending spree in the 1 ast quarter, consumer debt 
levels--already high--and growing perceptions of a sluggish economy have tempered consumer 
spending. My forecast suggests that growth for all of 1985 will prove to have been about 2.5 
percent, compared with 1984's torrid 6.8 percent. 
Looking to 1986, I expect the economy to continue along its sluggish path. The Blue Chip 
consensus forecasts are for 3.0 percent growth in real GNP, with the GNP deflator rising to 3.9 
percent. I generally agree with this outlook, although I believe that inflation may be a little 
higher due to further weakness in the dollar. 
In summary, the economic outlook is neither brilliant nor hopeless. The outlook is for an 
economy that lumbers forward, but lacks real bounce, and an economy that is seeking a more 
permanent sense of direction. This outlook underscores the need for economic policy that 
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encourages economic growth abroad, particularly in developing countries, and for a policy that 
removes the basic imbalances in the economy . In short, the outlook will turn brighter only when 
deficits are reduced, more balance is restored to economic policy, and real interest rates 
decline. This would certainly help basic industries to return to health. 
Farm Economy: Another Difficult Year 
Financial problems continue to mourt for farmers in the nation and in the Kansas City 
Federal Reserve district. U.S. farmers are harvesting a bumper crop, export markets remain in 
the doldrums, and farm prices continue to slump. Farm lenders watch as loan losses rise and 
collateral values decline. All in all, agriculture seems poised for a period of great financial 
stress and reckoning. Allow me to discuss some recent developments in the farm economy, the 
current situation for farm lenders, and the outlook for the coming year. 
Mother Nature blessed U.S. farmers this year even i~ no one else did. Record feed grain and 
near record wheat and soybean crops will go into the bin this fall. With an 8.5 billion bushel 
corn crop, corn carryover supplies will nearly double in the coming marketing year. ~Jheat 
stocks, already large, will get bigger. So, two years after the PIK program, we are fast 
approaching the huge stocks that spawned that program. 
Meanwhile, farm exports have weakened markedly in 1985. The value of farm exports is 
estimated as declining to $32 billion, 15 percent below 1984 . World crop supplies remain large, 
competitors are anxious to market their stocks, and demand remains weakened by slow economic 
growth in low- and middle-income trading partner countries. Many persons have expressed hope 
that a weaker dollar will turn U.S farm export sales around. Although an important factor, a 
weaker dollar will not help U.S. farm exports as much as would improved economic growth in the 
Third World. 
With very large stocks and weak foreign demand, crop prices trended downward all year. In 
late 1985, prices for major crops were as much as 20 to 25 percent below what they had been a 
year before. During the heart of the harvest, corn prices at country elevators may have dipped 
below $2.00 for the first time since 1982. Because of the low market prices, most farmers will 
put their grain into CCC stocks this fall, and government stocks promise to be very big 
throughout 1986. 
Livestock prices have been disappointing in 1985. As the year began, lenders and borrowers 
expected solid livestock profits to provide some stability to farm finances. But red meat 
prices, and especially cattle prices, have been weaker than anticipated. For example, many 
analysts expected prices for finished steers to approach $70 a hundredweight by midyear; instead, 
prices were in the low $50 range. Few explanations can be given for this disappointment, but 
weak consumer demand figures to be a major factor. With reduced livestock supplies as we move 
into 1986, however, red meat prices should strengthen in coming months. 
With weak crop and livestock prices, farm income dropped sharply in 1985. Net farm income 
may have declined nearly 30 percent, from $34.5 billion in 1984 to perhaps $24 billion in 1985. 
Direct government payments will make up an important portion of 1985 farm income. The USDA 
estimates that direct government payments for farm commodity programs could exceed $9 billion in 
1985, up slightly from what they were in 1984 when commodity prices were stronger. 
Farmland values are still dropping in light of the weakening farm economy and still high 
interest rates on farm loans. At the end of the third quarter of 1985, district farmland values 
had fallen 22 percent from the previous year and 44 percent from the 1981 peak. The leading edge 
of decline in values is now probably more than 50 percent off the market high. With many farm 
assets up for sale in the next few months and with very soft commodity markets, the prolonged 
fall in farmland values gives no signs of being over. 
The Status of Farm Lenders 
Farm lenders remain severely strained by further deterioration in the quality of their loan 
portfolios. Data through the first half of 1985 indicate that both agricultural banks and the 
Farm Credit System were experiencing more problems than in 1984. 
Farm loan losses continue to mount. During the first half of 1985, U.S. commercial banks 
charged off 1. 3 percent of their farm 1 oans, at-out twice the rate of one year before. Even 
bigger writedowns were expected in the second half. 
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Loan conditions at the nation's aoricultural banks deteriorated further in the first half of 
1985. Loan losses for these banks amounted to 0.7 percent of total loans, nearly double the 
losses of a year earlier. And losses at agricultural banks still run well above those for 
nonagricultural banks. 
Growing numbers of past-due and nonaccrual loans verify that many farm loan problems simply 
were postponed in the sp r ing of 1985. Total past due loans at the nation's agricultural banks in 
late 1985 were running about 20 percent above a year before. P.ut even more disturbing, 
nonaccrual loans were running more than 50 percent higher. These nonaccrual loans are the ones 
that have a high probability of later turning into uncollectible credits. 
Finally, the number of agricultural bank failures continued to climb steadily in 1985. Of 
the 100 banks that had failed by fall months, 51 were agricultural banks. That compares to just 
25 for all of 1984. 
The financial woes of the Farm Credit System also are deepening, increasingly in a highly 
publicized fashion. Wall Street was rudely awakened to the System's problems in September when 
the governor of the FCA publicly announced a need for public assistance to the System. 
Afterward, the spread on FCS bonds widened sharply over Treasury securities. At mid-fall, that 
spread was about 100 basis points compared with 15 to 30 points normally. 
Financial markets will remain skittish about FCS bonds in the months to come. The FCS has 
reported a loss of $426 million for the first nine months of 1985, and it no doubt will register 
its first annual loss. At mid-fall the System listed about $11 billion in delinquent loans and 
reported primary capital at about $5 billion. 
All of these data, therefore, L•nderscore the further unwinding of farm credit. conditions. 
While I would like to say that the worst is over, the outlook for the farm economy suqgests that 
the four to six months of mid-winter 1985-86 will be a time for difficult reckoning f0r farm 
borrowers and 1 enders. Lenders wi 11 be forced into more foreclosures and decisions t o deny 
production credit. ~! hen next spring's planting season is over, more farmers will go without 
credit than the previous year. Farm assets will crowd already thin markets, and land values can 
be expected to drop still further. Barring major action by Congress on new farm credit 
legislation, the FmHA will remain the primary safety valve for troubled farmers. Next sp r ing it 
is likely that the FmHA will again write a large numbe1· of direct operating loans. 
The Farm Financial Outlook 
U.S. agriculture faces another difficult year in 1986. Farm income is expected to weaken 
somewhat, as weak crop prices and a possible reduction in r.rop production more than offset 
stronger livestock profits. Livestock prices are expected to increase in the first half of 1986 
as supplies decline. Red meat prices in particular should benefit. Livestock profit margins 
will be helped by cheap feedstuff prices. Crop prices should remain weak throughout the year, 
although prices may not decline much further from current levels. Huge carryover stocks will be 
the major factor depressing prices. The weaker dollar could lead to some improvement in farm 
exports, but sales are expected to remain sluggish due to weak economies in the developing world. 
Overall, farm income could decline $2 to $3 billion next year, with a similar fall in net cash 
income. 
~lith that level of farm income, financial stress is almost certain to build. Stress will 
remain concentrated among commercial scale farms that are highly leveraged. In particular, 
farmers and ranchers with debt-asset ratios over 40 percent and with negative cash flows wi 11 
have extreme difficulty servicing their debt. 
By any measure, the farm credit problem has significant dimensions. Two recent studies 
further clarify the a!T'cunt of farm debt that is troubled. In ~'uly, the U.S. Department of 
Aoriculture estimated that 129,000 commercial farms--one-fifth of all farms with annual sales of 
over $40,000--were under serious financial stress as the year began, pecause they had both a 
negative cash flow and a debt-asset ratio of more than 40 percent. These producers wer~ 
estimated to owe approximately 39 percent of farm operator debt, or about $46 billion. 
Isolating only the most severely stressed, or those commercial farms with debt-asset ratios over 
70 percent and negative cash flows, those producers numbered about 55,000 farms, a twelfth of all 
commercial farms, and they owed nearly a fifth of all farm operator debt, or approximately $23 
billion. 
8 
Other estimates also suggest that a considerable farm loan problem still lies ahead. 
Melichar recently classified the financial position of farm ope3ators according to debt-asset 
ratio, amount of equity, return on assets, and return on equity. His results, while different 
from the USDA results cited above, still suggest that a substantial portion of farm assets must 
move from weak to stronger hands. Melichar concluded that about 10 percent of commercial farms, 
or about 63,000 farms, were ~vulnerable~ as the year began. These farms might be thought of as 
being in peril of failing. Interestingly, he estimated that these farms owe about $23 billion to 
all farm lenders, the same amount USDA estimated for the worst borrower category. Melichar also 
estimated that an additional 44,000 farms. 7 percent of commercial farms, were "stressed," or 
headed for trouble in the next few years. These farms owe another $10 billion to farm lenders. 
Thus, comparing the USDA estimates for farms with negative cash flows having debt-asset 
ratios over 70 percent and Me 1 i char's "vul nerab 1 e" category, the number of farm opera tors in 
danger of failing in the near term is probably 55,000 to 65,000, and these farm busiPesses appear 
to owe $23 billion to all farm lenders. 
With 1 ow farm income in 1986, therefore, the stage appears to be set for a period of 
significant financial stress and reckoning. Many farm loans have been reluctantly renewed in 
recent years--and especially this past spring--because lenders were unwilling to force settlement 
of loans when faced with losses from the sale of acquired assets. Increasingly, however, lenders 
lack the freedom to renew troubled loans. Stockholders are worried about bank earnings, and in 
some cases bank soundness. Regulators continue to voice concerns over the deteriorating quality 
of farm loan portfolios. Thus, farm liquidations, both full and partial, can be expected to run 
well above normal, particularly in the early spring months when most credit decisions are 
finalized. 
With many farm assets for sale, and with a bleak outlook for the farm economy, farm asset 
values will remain under downward pressure in 1986. Farm loan interest rates are expected to 
remain high, contributing to lower land values. Many persons are now asking how far land values 
could fall. The arswer is uncertain at prPsent, but two key factors will govern the outcome. 
The first is the floor that net cash returns will provide. Most observers agree that a positive 
cash flow is the market fundamental that will eventually support values. With land in some 
regions now 60 percent off the market high, a positive cash flow is not far distant. Final 
passage of the Farm Bill will help to eliminate uncertainty about what cash flow assumptions to 
make. 
The second key factor is the rate at which farm credit problems are resolved. Up to now, 
agriculture has adjusted to its new market reality at a painful, but still fairly manageable, 
rate. That is a major reason why land values have declined at a fast but even pace. But an 
accelerated handling of farm credit problems could quite ec.sily force large amounts of farm 
assets onto thin markets, leading to precipitous declines in values. With the prospect for that 
development still very real, there remains a need for policymakers to continue to assess the role 
for public policy in moderating agriculture's adjustment. 
The coming year promises to be another interesting one for the Farm Credit System. Wall 
Street likely will remain edgy about FCS bonds, and the spread over Treasury securities probably 
will remain historically high. Structural changes in the system will continue to be made. 
Production Credit Associations and Federal Land Bank Associations are likely to merge into fewer 
local associations, thereby allowing consolidation of capital. 
1 U.S Department of Agriculture. Financial Characteristics of U.S. Farms, January 1985, 
Agriculture Information Bulletin, No. 495. 
2 Farm operator debt totals about $120 billion. The remaining $93 billion of farm sector deht is 
in the hands of landlords or is borrowed by farmers for nonfarm purposes. 
3 Emanuel Melichar. "Farm Financial Experience and .Agricultural Banking Experience," Testimony 
before the Housing Banking Committee, October 23, 1985. 
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Conclusions 
I recently returned from a worldwide conference of agricultural economists in Spain. The 
theme of that conference was "Agriculture in a Turbulent World." Discussions there reaffirmed my 
conviction that U.S. agriculture is adjusting to new global and economic realities. The world is 
awash in grain, and food demand is anemic. Thus, there is no quick fix for U.S. agriculture's 
problems. Rather, restoring farm prosperity depends on greater balance in U.S macroeconomic 
policy, more market-oriented farm policy, and more vigorous economic growth in the developing 
world. Until these factors emerge and take hold, agriculture's current period of adjustment 
promises to remain turbulent. 
AGRICULTURAL FINANCE AND CREDIT: THE FARM VIEW (MICRO) 
Robert W. Jolly 
Professor of Economics, and 
Assistant Dean of Agriculture 
Iowa State University 
The financial cns1s in agriculture has been a reality for some farm families since early 
1980. As with any industry-wide upheaval, it was slow in developing. Its origins can be traced 
back at least a decade. Today we know more about farm financial conditions than at any time 
since the crisis began. However, little consensus exists among farmers, policymakers, or 
academic people about agriculture ' s capacity to adjust to financial stress, or the type of public 
intervention that would be appropriate if existing institutions and markets are to be assisted. 
This paper is largely descriptive. It is partly background for policy papers to be 
presented later in the seminar. 
U.S . Farm Financial Conditions, 1985 
At first glance, the current farm financial problems appear to be widespread and fairly 
uniform among farm families. This is not the case. Some farmers are earning acceptable incomes 
and rates of return. Others are failing utterly. These differences make public financial policy 
difficult to design and even more difficult to administer. 
Another characteristic that makes the situation difficult is that it has both human anci 
financial dimensions. Farm financial stress is a human problem. It affects a definable group 
within the farm population . As with any crisis, financial stress causes suffering and pain. 
There is a financial side as well. Financial and farm asset markets are not performing well. 
Many institutions ranging from county seat banks and grain elevators to the farm credit system 
seem to be in jeopardy. Although the human side of this crisis gets some place in the press, the 
financial dimension is receiving the attention of the policymakers. 
Incidence and Relative Frequency of Financial Stress 
Measuring financial stress is not straightforward. In the short run, a farm's negative cash 
flow can indicate stress. It may also reflect expansion or a routine buildup in grain or 
livestock inventories. The debt-to-asset (D/A) ratio has been widely used as a measure of 
stress. Normally the D/A ratio measures solvency. However, it can also be used as a rough 
measure of liquidity. With rates of return to ownec assets currently averaging 6 to 7 percent 
and debt service costs (principal and interest) averaging 15 to 16 percent, farmers with a D/A 
ratio exceeding 40 percent can be expected to have a negative cash flow . 
Insolvency is the extreme measure of stress. When a farm has debts that exceed the value of 
its assets, it is in most cases a fail-and-cease operation. The insolvency rate is ex post, and 
not a good leading· indicator of financial problems. 
Table 1 gives the proportion of farms falling in these three stress categories for the 
United States and 10 regions. Estimates are based on data from the USDA's Farm Costs and Returns 
Survey, and reflect January 1985 conditions. 
Slightly more than 50 percent of U.S. farm operators .in 1984 failed to generate a 
positive cash flow. In other words, farm and nonfarm 1ncome could not meet all cash 
obligations including debt service. 
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Table 1. Incidence and Relative Frequency of Financially Stressed Farm Operations, by Region 
Percent distribution b~ region Percent of farms in region 
Stress categor~ 
All Negative1 D/A ratio Negative1 D/A ratio Region farms cash flow over 40% Insolvent cash flow over 40% I nso 1 vent 
Northeast 7.2 4.5 1.0 0.2 62.8 14.2 3.0 
Lake States 12.7 6.0 3.3 0.4 47.3 25.6 3.3 
Corn Belt 21.3 9.9 5.3 0.8 46.4 24.7 3.9 
Northern Plains 10.7 5.3 2.9 0.4 49.1 26.7 4.0 
Appalachia 13.7 6.6 1.3 0.1 48.0 9.5 0.9 
Southeast 6.0 2.9 0.8 0.2 48.3 13.2 3.0 
Delta 5.4 3.5 1.0 0.2 64.4 17.7 4.1 
Southern Plains 12.0 6.1 1.3 0.3 51.2 11.2 2.1 
Mountain 5.4 2.9 1.2 0.1 53.4 22.0 2.4 
Pacific 5.7 2.7 1.0 0.2 47.5 16.6 3.2 
United States 100.0 50.3 19.0 3.0 
1Net cash income from far~ing plus off-farm income less estimated family living expenditures and 
principal payment. 
Source: 1984 Farm Costs and Returns Survey, USDA. 
Over 18 percent of farmers had D/A ratios over 40 percent. Nearly 3 percent were 
in sol vent. 
Financially stressed farme>rs were most common in the Lake States, Corn Belt, and 
Northern Plains. For the most part this pattern reflects the distribution of farm 
operations in the United States. 
In relative terms, a oreater proportion of farm operators were experiencing cash flow 
problems in the Northeast and the Delta than in other regions. 
Farmers with high D/A ratios, including insolvent operations, were relatively more 
common in the Corn Belt, Northern Plains, and the Delta. 
Appalachia, Southern Plains, and Mountain States showed average or above average 
proportions of farmers with cash flow problems. However, insolvency and high D/A 
ratios seem significar.tly less of a problem there than in the Midwest. 
One commonly held helief is that farm debt problems primarily affect large high-rolling 
operations of mid-sized, inefficient farms. Table 2 reports the frequency of financial stress by 
annual sales class. 
The size composition of the farm popu 1 at ion as defined by the Farm Costs and Return 
Survey is given in the column headed total farms. Over 60 percent of the population 
has annual sales less than $40,000. In terms of a corn farm, this is a size of less 
than 120 acres. 
The frequency of financial stress follows the farm size distribution closely. The most 
common farm size with cash flow or solvency problems is the small part-time operation. 
In relative terms some differences between smi!ll and large farms are evident. Small 
f~rms tend to experience relatively more cash flow problems. Larger farmers, on the 
other hand, show proportionally a much greater frequency of high leverage and 
insolvency. 
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Table 2. Incidence and Relative Frequency of Financially Stressed Farm Operations, by Sales 
Class 
Annual 
sales value 
(thousand 
dollars) 
500 and over 
250-499 
100-249 
40-99 
10-39 
Less than 10 
United States 
All 
farms 
1.8 
4.1 
13.6 
18.1 
23.3 
39.2 
100.0 
Percent distribution b~ region 
Stress 
Negative 1 D/A ratio cash flow over 40% Insolvent 
0.7 0. 7 0.1 
1.5 1.6 0.? 
5.4 4.5 0.6 
8.6 5.0 0.8 
13.4 3.8 0.8 
20.6 3.4 0.4 
50.3 19.0 3.0 
Percent of farms in region 
cateqor~ 
Negative1 D/A ratio cash flow over 40% Insolvent 
38.9 38.9 6.0 
36.6 39.0 5.8 
39.7 33.1 4.7 
47.5 27.6 4.4 
57.5 16.3 3.4 
52.6 8.7 1.0 
1Net cash income from farming plus off-farm income less estimated family living expenditures and 
principal payment. 
Source : 1984 Farm Costs and Returns Survey, USDA. 
Severity of Financial Stress 
The severity of financial stress in the United States cannot be inferred directly from 
Tables 1 and 2. A farm firm's earned equity growth rate can provide an approximate measure of 
financ i al stress. The equity growth rate in this analysis is calculated as follows: the dollar 
growth in equity is equal to net cash farm income plus off-farm income less family living expen-
ditures. If positive, the money i s available to reduce principal, replace capital equipment , 
expand, or serve as a risk reserve. If negative , the shortfall is either added to debt (hence 
subtracted from equity) or discharged by the lender. The equity growth rate (EGR) is obtained by 
dividing the dollar growth in equity by the firm's market value equity or net worth. In this 
ratio form, the magnitude of the equity gain or loss is expressed relative to the size of the 
farm's net worth. 
In Table 3 five EGR ranges are defined. Farms with an EGR less than -20 percent are losing 
20 percent or more of their equity from earnings alone. With declining asset values, farms in 
this category are extremely vulnerable to financial failure. Insolvent -~'irms are included in 
this category. 
Farms with an EGR from -20 to -5 percent are likely experiencing serious financial 
difficulties. Interest payment obligations are continuing to accumulate. No principal payments 
are being made. Farms with an EGR from -5 to +5 are in limbo. They cannot. replace equipment or 
meet principal repayment requirements. With an EGR from +5 to +20 the farm business is showing 
reasonable progress. Equity may still fall due to declining asset values. However, the farm's 
earnings are satisfactory. 
A farm with an EGR exceeding 20 percent would, .at first glance, seem exceptional. The EGR 
may be due to very high earnings on assets. However, it may also be due to a small positive 
income combined with an even smaller net worth. 
The distribution of farm operators, their debt, and assets among the five EGR categories is 
given in Table 3. Several key results are indicated: 
For the United States, 15 percent of the farm operators are insolvent or have an EGR 
less than 15 percent. These farmers control nearly 28 percent of U.S. farm operator 
debt and 8.8 percent of farm assets. In general, this group will not survive. 
At the other extreme, 15.5 percent of farm operators showed an· EGR exceeding 20 percent 
in 1984. This group controls 14.7 percent of the debts and 10 percent of the assets. 
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Table 3. Percentage Distribution of Number of Farm Operators, Their Debts, and Their Assets, by 
Equity Growth Rate and Region 
Region and 
Percentage of regional 
Insolvent 
total, by equity growth rate (percent) 
category l ess than -20 -20 to -5 -5 to +5 +5 to +20 Over +20 
Northeast 
Operators 16.5 23.9 31.2 17.6 11.0 
Debt 26.8 16. 7 21.7 19.9 14.7 
Assets 7.4 19.9 43.2 10.0 9.5 
Lake States 
Operators 12.7 15.9 28.7 28.1 14.8 
Debt 23.1 12.6 23.5 30.6 10.0 
Assets 8.5 12 .4 33.4 37.3 8.3 
Corn Belt 
Operators 14 . 2 15.3 ?6.0 25.2 19.2 
Debt 28.1 11. 4 20.0 20.5 20 .0 
Assets 9.9 12.4 33.8 30.2 13.9 
Northern Plains 
Operators 17.5 13.7 28.9 25.8 13.9 
Debt 24. 2 17.7 23.6 21.1 13.4 
Assets 9.7 13.4 37.9 30.8 8.3 
Appalachia 
Operators 14 . 4 18.8 26.6 23 .9 16.3 
Debt 16.9 11.1 22.9 25.6 23.5 
Assets 5.7 13.8 40.1 27.4 13.1 
Southeast 
Ope rators 15.9 19.9 24.9 23.4 15.7 
Debt 37.6 15.9 15.7 16.1 14.5 
Assets 9.5 15.1 43 . 1 20.1 12.5 
Delta 
Operators 19.0 24.6 27 . 1 15.1 14.2 
Oebt 32.6 18.6 15.1 9.5 14.2 
Assets 9.1 18.3 33.5 15.2 8.1 
Southern Plains 
Operators 17.4 19.0 27.3 21.1 15.1 
Debt 35.1 19.5 17.8 15.5 12.2 
Assets 9.1 16.9 47.0 18.8 8.3 
Mountain 
Operators 14.0 13 .6 39.1 20.5 12.7 
Debt 24.6 15.2 29.6 18.6 11.8 
Assets 8.2 11.8 53.4 20.4 6.3 
Pacific 
Opera t ors 10.7 17.2 31.0 27.1 J 4. 2 
Debt 35.1 11.5 20.8 20.4 12.2 
Assets 8.4 12.9 44.5 25.2 8.8 
Uni t ed States 
Operators 15 . 1 17.5 28.3 23.6 15.5 
Debt 27.6 14.3 22.2 21.2 14.7 
Assets 8.8 14.3 40.8 26. 2 10.0 
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Combining firms with EGR less than 5 percent, 60.9 percent of the operators controlling 
64.1 percent of the debt are 1 ikely to experience financial stress and need to make 
operating changes if they are to remain viable. 
In relative terms, the Corn Belt and Lake States show fewer farmers in the -20 percent 
EGR groups and more in the +20 percent groups. 
In the Delta, Southern Plains, and Southeast more operators are experiencing severe 
financial stress. Furthermore, these farmers owe 30 percent of the regional farm debt. 
The Pacific States show a very high concentration of debt, as 35 percent is held by a 
relatively few severely stressed farm operators. 
In table 4, we look at the severity of financial stress as a function of farm size. 
Table 4. Percentage Distribution of Number of Farm Operators, Their Debts, and Their Assets, by 
Equity Growth Rate and Sales Class 
Annual sales 
value (thousand 
dollars) and 
category 
500 + 
Operators 
Debt 
Assets 
250-499 
Operators 
Debt 
Assets 
100-?49 
Operators 
Debt 
Assets 
40-99 
Operators 
Debt 
Assets 
Less than 40 
Operators 
Debt 
Assets 
United States 
Operators 
Debt 
Assets 
Insolvent 
less than -20 
16.1 
32.6 
13.1 
13.7 
22.4 
9.5 
13.0 
22.8 
7.8 
15.3 
31.5 
9.5 
15.4 
31.9 
7.3 
15.1 
27.6 
8.8 
Percentage distribution of sales class total, 
by equity growth rate (percent) 
-20 to -5 -5 to +5 +5 to +20 
8.9 18.9 23.3 
7.5 18.2 21.2 
12.8 28.7 27.4 
6.5 17.8 27.0 
9.9 23.2 26.6 
8.1 35.9 32.7 
10.2 23.0 33.3 
15.5 22.6 25.5 
11.3 37.8 32.8 
14.0 32.2 25.5 
20.0 25.3 14.5 
15.0 47.5 22.6 
21.0 29.0 20.5 
17.0 20.8 15.6 
20.0 45.1 20.5 
17.5 28.3 23.6 
14.3 22.2 21.2 
14.3 40.8 26.2 
Over +20 
32.9 
20.4 
17.9 
23.5 
17.9 
13.7 
20.5 
13.6 
10.3 
12.9 
8.7 
5.4 
13.9 
14.6 
8.2 
15.5 
14.7 
10.0 
The largest farm sizes have the greatest proportion of high-income and high-stress 
farms. 
Farmers with annual sales under $100,000 show relatively few high EGR farms. The 
concentration of debt in stressed operations is greater than average. 
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Financial stress affects all size categories. However, the larger sales category 
accounts for relatively more of the debt and assets and fewer operators. 
Characteristics of Farm Operators 
The Farm Costs and Returns data contain relatively little demographic information on farm 
operators. Table 5 reports characteristics of Iowa farm families by 0/A class. These data were 
collected in early 1985. 
Table 5. Average 1985 Financial Condition of Sample Iowa Farm Operators, by 1985 Debt-to-Asset 
Ratio 
Financial or 
operator characteristic 
Assets ($1000) 
Non-real estate 
Real estate 
Total 
Debt ( $1000) 
Non-real estate 
Real estate 
Total 
Net worth ($1000) 
Debt-to-asset ratio (%) 
Operator characteristic 
Age 
Years in farming 
Dependents 
Dependents <18 years 
Husband's education 1 
Wife's education 1 
Acres owned 
Acres rented 
Acres operated 
Off-farm income ($) 
Percentage distribution 
Operators (%) 
Assets ( %) 
Debts (%) 
0-10 
136 
282 
418 
6 
4 
10 
408 
2.4 
59 
35 
2.4 
0.3 
2.2 
2.4 
235 
114 
327 
7738 
35 
29 
2 
10-40 
166 
375 
541 
44 
82 
126 
415 
23.3 
54 
29 
3.1 
0.8 
2.3 
2.4 
280 
172 
1130 
5795 
32 
34 
25 
1 Ed~cation attainment, highest level attended: 
Debt-to-asset ratio (percent) 
40-70 70-100 100+ 
236 
420 
656 
121 
238 
359 
297 
54.7 
48 
25 
3.5 
1.1 
2.4 
2.5 
295 
285 
562 
6621 
21 
28 
48 
156 
348 
5011 
143 
251 
394 
110 
78.2 
46 
23 
3.7 
1.4 
2.3 
2.4 
271 
302 
539 
5574 
7 
7 
17 
85 
152 
237 
190 
124 
314 
-77 
132.5 
45 
22 
3.3 
1.2 
2.4 
2.4 
159 
3?6 
484 
9426 
4 
2 
8 
1 = grade school, 2 = high school, 3 = college or vocational 
Source: 1985 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
All farms 
166 
340 
506 
60 
101 
161 
345 
31.8 
54 
29 
3.0 
0.7 
2.3 
2.4 
261 
193 
433 
6779 
JOO 
100 
JOO 
Iowa farmers with small debt tend to be elder, with fewer dependents. They operate 
smaller acreages. 
Education level does not seem to he related closely to D/A class. 
The largest farms in terms of assets and acreage are in the 40 to 70 D/A group. 
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The distribution of operator's debt and assets among D/A groups parallels the national 
data. Iowa farmers with 0/A ratios over 40 percent have over 70 percent of the 
operator debt. 
Rapidly falling asset values have dramatically changed the financial condition of Iowa 
farmers in just a year's time. Table 6 gives the percentage change in balance sheet data for 
farmers in a given D/A group. 
Table 6. Percentage Change in Financial Condition, 1984-1985, Jowa Farm Operators 
Financial characteristic Average 40-70 70-100 100+ 
---------------------------percent--------------------------
Assets 
Non-real estate 
Real estate 
Total 
-8.8 
-21.5 
-17.7 
-6.9 -16.5 1.4 
-20.6 -31.4 -32.4 
-16.1 -26.2 -21.?. 
Debt 
Non-real estate 
Real estate 
Total 
13.2 
-1.9 
3.2 
7.0 
-1.6 
1.3 
-2.4 11.8 
-16.S -32.7 
-10.4 -6.9 
Net worth -24.8 -34.5 -88.4 -62.2 
Source: 1985 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
The sample average showed a loss in csset value of 17.7 percent -- roughly the decline 
in land values. Debt levels increased sharply, as non-real estate debt increased but 
real estate debt declined. Overall, equity fell nearly 25 percent in one year. 
Farmers in the 40-70 percent D/A group experienced moderate to severe stress. Changes 
in their averagP. balance sheet followed the sample average. However, equity fell 34.5 
percent. 
The hioh-debt farm operators in the 70-100 0/A group lost over 88 percent of their 
equity: This came despite attempts to reduce debt. Falling asset markets and partial 
liquidations were the likely culprits. 
Farms that were insolvent in January 1984 increased non-real estate debt during the 
year. Asset values declined. Net worth, already negative, fell an additional 62 
percent. 
Farm-Level Adjustments to Financial Stress 
Data presented in this report suggest that up to two-thirds of the farm debt in the United 
States is held by farm businesses experiencing financial stress. This is clearly an unstable 
situation. In the short run, farms may adjust by attempting to increase productivity, by 
reducing costs, or by reducing principal repayment. In the longer run, farm operations will need 
to adjust enterprises and in many cases restructure assets and liabilities. Financial 
restructuring involves selling assets, reducing debts, and, in some situations, renegotiating 
principal balances with lenders. The restructuring process takes time. For some farm 
businesses, the adjustment is relatively minor. For others, so much of the asset base must be 
sold that the firm will likely fail before the restructuring can be accomplished. 
Restructuring requirements for financially stressed farm businesses were estimated from Iowa 
Farm Finance Survey data. For the average farm in 40-70 and 70-100 D/A group three common 
t~chniques were applied in restructuring. A scale-back involves selling assets, retiring debts 
and reducing the size of the business. A sale-leaseback liquidates assets, but then assumes that 
assets could be leased at prevailing rates. In debt discharge it is assumed that the lender 
writes off sufficient debt to produce a positive cash flow. 
16 
The results of this analysis were presented in Table 7 for three income levels. At current 
incomes, the average 40-70 percent 0/A producer shows a negative cash flow, -$11,400. Using a 
scale-back, a positive cash flow could be produced by selling 28.6 percent of the firm's owned 
assets. Over 44 percent of the debt would be reduced. A sale-leaseback reduces the extent of 
1 i qui dati on required to 21. 5 percent. If the 1 ender wou 1 d discharge 20 percent of the debt --
about $72,000 (Table 5) -- the business would have a positive cash flow. The results in Table 7 
suggest: 
For moderate debt operations and current income levels, liquidation requirements are 
extensive but generally feasible. Changes in income levels have a significant impact 
on the extent and feasibility of restructuring for this group. 
Debt discharge, in general, offers only a partial solution to restructuring problems. 
For high-debt farms, the 70-100 percent D/A group, all restructuring options seem 
scarcely feasible. The prospect of liquidating 70 to 80 percent of a farm's asset base 
with a lease-back seems fortuitous at best. Farmers in this group, in general, are 
living on borrowed time. 
Table 7. Average Percent Asset and Debt Liquidation Required to Service Remaining Debt, by Debt-
to-Asset Ratio and Current Income Level, Iowa Farm Operators 
Item 
Net cash flow ($1000) 
Restructuring option 
(percentage change) 
Scaleback 
Asset 
Debt 
Sale-leaseback 
Asset 
Debt 
Debt discharge 
Debt 
Low 
income 
-20.0 
43.0 
66.6 
35.5 
55.0 
35.6 
Debt-to-asset 
40-70 
Current High 
income income 
-11.4 -2.9 
28.6 8.7 
44.3 13.5 
21.5 5.8 
33.3 9.0 
20.3 5.2 
ratio (Eercent) 
70-100 
Low Current High 
income income income 
-37.4 -30.5 -23.7 
NF NF NF 
NF NF NF 
86.3 74.8 61.8 
94.1 81.5 67.4 
59.3 48.4 37.6 
Note: Current income -- 7.5 percent cash return on assets; low income -- 6.5 percent cash 
return on assets; high income -- 8.5 percent cash return on assets. The recovery rate 
on liquidated assets is assumed to be 85 percent. 
Source: Jolly and Doye, FAPRI Staff Report #8. 
Final Comments 
Currently a third of the farmers in the United States are experiencing serious financial 
problems. Unfortunately, this group owes most of the money. Financial restructuring offers the 
main long-term solution to this debt crisis. However, doing so will take time -- perhaps up to 
an additional five years. Furthermore, there is real doubt as to the capacity of agricultural 
asset markets to accommodate such a massive adjustment. Up to 15 to 20 percent of farm assets 
may be liquidated as farmers and lenders attempt to adjust to current economic conditions. This 
compares to the historical 2-4 percent of annual based sales. Improved incomes would lessen, but 
not e 1 imina te, the need for extensive res tructuri nc. Lower farm incomes would be a disaster. 
The key financial policy issue is how to buy sufficient time to make the transition without 
incurring unacceptable economic and human costs. 
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AGRICULTURE INTERNATIONALIZED -- THE MEANING 
Elmer W. Learn 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Davis 
Introduction 
It is a pleasure to take part in this seminar on agricultural policy. Within our democratic 
form of government an informed citizenry that has taken the opportunity to ex.plore and debate 
political and economic choices represents our best hope for wise public policy. I'm pleased to 
participate. 
When I saw Harold Breimyer this summer he advised me not to attempt to provide answers but 
simply to present background that aids in understanding the major questions faced by farmers and 
agribusiness 1 eaders today. Si nee I don't have the answers I am more than happy to follow 
Professor Breimyer's advice. 
My theme is that conditions in the 1950s and 1960s were vastly simpler and more amenable to 
influence by domestic policies than is true today. I argue that the major cause of increased 
complexity is the internationalization of the U.S. economy in general and the agricultural sector 
of that economy in particular. 
Increased interdependency with other nations is not limited to the United States. It has 
been a worldwide phenomenon in which almost all nations have been participants. Even after 
adjusting for the influence of inflation, world trade in 1980 was almost three times the level in 
1970 and more than 10 times that of 1950. Although trade has fallen by more than 10 percent 
since 1980 because of worldwide economic recession, it is unlikely that commerce among nations 
will ever return to the levels of 1970. It is a virtual certainty that we will not revert to the 
conditions of the 1950s and 1960s. We have little choice, as individuals or as a nation, other 
than to try to understand the economic and policy choices available to us in this interdependent 
world. 
U.S. Agriculture and the World in the 1950s 
By way of background, in the early 1950s we began to accept as chronic that American 
agriculture has the capacity to produce more than consumers are willing to buy at prlces 
acceptable to farmers. The condition was seen as unlikely to be solved by continued growth in 
U.S. population and per capita incomes. 
Yet our analysis of agriculture's economic problems and our search for policy solutions was 
limited for the most part to looking at agriculture in relative isolation. We discussed and 
imp 1 emented agri cu ltura 1 po 1 i ci es with 1 i ttl e concern for their effects on the rest of the 
domestic economy and with only limited attention to the rest of the world. We did not look to 
other nation~ as a source of, nor as a solution for, our agricultural difficulties. We paid 
1 ittle attention to other nations as competitors in foreign markets or as potential long-term 
customers. 
The prevailing view in the 1950s was that the solution to agriculture's price and income 
difficulties would be found within agriculture and within the United States. We sought price 
stability at levels higher than markets would have provided. As a result we stored large 
quantities of farm products under government ownership despite efforts to reduce production. By 
1954 we recognized that the volume of stocks and the cost of their storage was approaching 
politically unacceptable levels. Then for the first time since the 1920s we began to consider 
policy solutions that went beyond our borders. 
We enacted Public Law 480, the Food-for-Peace program, with proclamations that the purpose 
was humanitarian, i.e., to bring food to the hungry in the developing world. Nevertheless, we 
knew that its primary purpose was surplus disposal. It was a way to dispose of stocks in a 
manner that was less costly than continued storage and more politically acceptable than dumping 
grain on the ground or sinking it in the ocean. The program did have, and continues to have, 
humanitarian benefits but we should not delude ourselves into believing that humanitarianism was 
the primary motivation for the legislation. 
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Even with P.L. 480 in place we took a casual view toward the rest of the world as we sought 
agricultural policy solutions. We continued to set price support levels with almost total 
disregard for international price levels. We sought and gained exclusion of agricultural 
commodities from some of the key provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
commonly known as GATT. In doing so we informed the international community that domestic 
agricultural policy was of higher priority than our commitment to freer trade. 
Because of the presence of the GATT, many restrictions to world trade in industrial products 
have been reduced. Unfortunately, we cannot say the same for agriculture. As other nations have 
developed and refined their own agricultural policies they, too, have taken advantage of the GATT 
exceptions for agricultural commodities. Thus, our innovation has been turned against us in the 
1980s as we have sought to retain export markets. 
Agriculture's main, if not sole, policy concern in the 1950s was farm policy. In promoting 
farm policy farmers and their leaders paid little attention to the effect their actions would 
have on the rest of the economy or the rest of the world. Neither did they participate to a 
significant degree in the development of general economic or trade policies . When they did 
participate, as in the GATT negotiations, the context was often the seeking of special 
recognition for agriculture. 
Lest these comments be misunderstood, let me emphasize that farmers and farm policy makers 
were not entirely selfish in their concerns . There was relatively little objection to looking on 
the agricultural economy as relatively self contained, and there was some validity to the belief 
that what was good for agriculture was good for society. No nation in history had had the 
assurance of the bountiful supply of low cost and high quality food that our citizens enjoyed 
during the 1950s and 1960s. 
But changes that have occurred between 1950 and 1985, especially changes of the past 15 
years, make an isolationist attitude on the part of agricultural policy makers no longer in the 
best interest of agriculture nor of society generally. It is these changes to which I wish to 
devote the remainder of this paper. Briefly stated, the U.S. economy, inc 1 ud i ng, or perhaps 
especially, its agricultural portion, has become internationali zed. 
The Internationalization of U.S. Agriculture 
The beginnings of internationalization were visible in the late 1950s to those who looked 
for them, but most of us didn't look. For example, P.L. 480 included a title that provided for 
rna rket promotion and deve 1 opment. In the 1 ate 1950s and early 1 960s we had some successes. 
Among the most notable were the opening of markets for U.S. frozen chickens in western Europe and 
for U.S. wheat in Japan. 
We soon learned that to sell our farm products abroad we had to buy industrial products from 
others. We also learned that technology such as that which led to low-priced chicken meat in the 
United States was easily transferred. Thus, for example, German markets for U.S. poultry were 
quickly transformed into markets for U.S. corn and soybeans as German farmers adopted our 
techniques for mass production of poultry. This delighted German farmers and U.S. corn and 
soybean growers. But it was not welcomed by the U.S. poultry industry, which encouraged 
President Kennedy to engage in a diplomatic exercise that has become known as the "chicken war." 
The poultry experience in Western Europe illustrates a fundamental feature of international 
trade. Even though there is incontrovertible evidence of the overall benefits of trade there 
generally are individual losers as well as winners in both importing and exporting nations. 
The "chicken war" was only the beginning of a series of disagreements on agricultural trade 
matters between the United States and its European allies. In fact, the formation of the 
European Common Market and deve 1 opment of its Common Agri cu ltura 1 Po 1 icy during the 1 ate 1 950s 
and early 1960s perhaps did more than anything else to alert us in the United States that our 
influence on international economic conditions is subject to constraints. We began to realize 
that in the development of domestic policies such as those relating to agriculture we would be 
required to pay much more attention to international factors than had been our practice. 
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International considerations undoubtedly influenced the nature of the 1965 farm bil l . 
Recall that we changed our system of price and i~come supports and lowered support prices, and we 
did so, in part, in order to make our exports more competitive. We offset the effect of lower 
prices on producers' incomes by making deficiency payments. To some of our critics this was not 
viewed as a move toward improved international relations. They saw deficiency payments as 
nothing more than an ill-disguised export subsidy. 
Exports of farm products nevertheless were slow to increase. Throughout the 1960s they 
never reached $7 billion. Even the peak of near that figure, which seems paltry by today's 
standards, was achieved only by shipping a third or more of the total under P.L. 480 and other 
government programs. 
As suggested earlier, there was some growth in markets for U.S. farm products in Europe and 
Japan, and this growth was a harbinger of things to come. It was an indication that economic 
growth in the last half of the 20th century would depend to a significant degree upon 
ever-increasing commerce among nations. As the fi nanc i a 1 strength of other economies improved, 
however, the postwar system of international finance dependent upon fixed exchange rates 
encountered increasing difficulty. It also became apparent to an inflation-plagued United States 
that part of our domestic economic pro~lems could be traced to use of the dollar as the base of 
this fixed-exchange international monetary system. The international economy became increasingly 
unstable as we moved from the decade of the 1960s to the 1970s. 
Three events in the early 1970s changed the world of U.S. agriculture in ways that few 
persons could have envisioned earlier: 
The first ever.t was devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and again in 1973. Along with 
these devaluations we ceased governance of the world financial system by the Bretton 
Woods agreement signed in the closing days of World War II. A 30 year period of 
relative stability in international financial trar.sactions was over. Americans and 
others were going to learn to cope with variability that results from unregulated 
international currency exchange. 
The second major event was a change in policy within the Soviet Union. Russia has long 
been plagued by erratic agricultural production. Since the end of World War II she had 
accommodated to shortages primarily by enforced reduction in consumption. In 1972 
Russia elected to make allowance for a short grain harvest by entering world markets as 
a major importer. 
The effect of the Russian decision was compounded by bad weather in portions of the 
U.S. Midwest and elsewhere and by a decline in the anchovy catch off the coast of Peru. 
The result was a shortage in supply of grain and protein meal and soaring prices. U.S. 
grain and soybean prices rose by 200 to 300 percent between the 1971 and 1974 crop 
years. 
The third event was the rise in oil prices resulting from the decision of the OPEC 
nations to act as international monopolists. 
By 1975 we were well aware that our nation and its agriculture had entered a new era. But 
we were slow to sort out causes and to decide how to adapt to our new circumstances. 
In some degree we misread the signals. Regarding the worldwide food situation we 
interpreted the events of 1972-74 as reversing the 40 year trend wherein world-wide supply 
outruns demand. Many persons proclaimed that the predictions of Malthus were finally becoming 
reality. They saw the era of surpluses giving way to a long-term struggle against widespread 
hunger. Production controls were replaced by unrestrained expansion as the Secretary of 
Agriculture (allegedly) urged farmers to plant "fence-row to fence-row" to meet expanded world 
needs. 
The 1973 farm bill continued support prices and government payments but most people viewed 
the legislation simply as a security blanket for farmers. They believed the price support and 
payment provisions would rarely have to be invoked because of high prices resulting from current 
and prospective worldwide food supply and demand conditions. 
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Due in part to 
times its 1970 level 
though not as much. 
in 1970. 
higher prices the dollar value of agricultural exports in 1974 was three 
and it was to be twice the 1974 level in 1981. Volume of exports rose too, 
In the peak year of 1980 export volume was two and a quarter times the level 
As exports and farm incomes soared to record levels farmers responded to their new-found 
prosperity and to the expectation of even greater opportunity in the future by going on an 
investment binge. Although interest rates rose in the later 1970s, high rates of inflation kept 
the real interest rate near, or in some months below, zero. Farm debt rose from $81 billion in 
1975 to $165 billion in 1980. It climbed further to more than $200 billion in 1983. More 
significant, debt rose from three and one half times net farm income in 1975 to twelve and one 
half times a reduced net income in 1983. 
Only in the last few years have we begun to sort out in a realistic fashion what really 
happened in the early 1970s. First, we now realize that the appearance of excess demand in the 
early 1970s probably was not a reversal but more than 1 ikely a short-term aberration in the 
long-term trend of world food demand and supply. Second, we now realize that the continued large 
exports of U.S. farm products through 1981 was due in part, if not in large measure, to a 
favorable competitive situation resulting from the relatively low value of the dollar in foreign 
exchange and to strong rates of economic growth throughout most of the world. When, in the 
1980s, those growth rates slackened and the dollar value changed from weakness to strength, it 
became somewhat easier to place the events of the 1970s in proper perspective. When all is said 
and done it is now apparent that because of our increased productive capacity and the expanded 
role of exports, U.S. agriculture can no longer obtain significant or lasting relief from farm 
policies developed in isolation from general domestic and international economic policies. 
What are some of the specifics of today's export markets? In 1950 exports absorbed about 15 
percent of our total farm output. Today they are the outlet for 25 percent. But even more 
significant than the increase in importance is the changed composition of our exports. 
Cotton and tobacco have been important export commodities for U.S. agriculture since 
colonial times. In 1950 they comprised about 40 percent of our agricultural exports. Today they 
account for 10 percent or less. 
Wheat has been and continues to be an important export commodity. In 1950 and today we 
provide about 40 percent of the total quantity traded on world markets. But today that amounts 
to 105 mi 11 ion tons compared to 21 mi 11 ion tons in 1950, and it amounts to 60 percent of our 
total production compared with 25 percent in 1950. 
But the most significant change and the one most important to Missouri farmers is what has 
happened to corn and soybeans. Corn exports have grown from 14 to 65 million tons and from 15 
percent to 35 percent of our production. We supply more than half of all the feed grains moving 
in world trade. 
The growth of soybean exports has been even more dramatic. In 1950 we exported a mere 
800,000 tons. Today we export slightly less than 30 million tons, which is 40 percent of our 
production and between 80 and 90 percent of total world trade. These statistics relate to trade 
in soybeans. If expressed in soybean equivalents to take account of trade in meal and oil the 
export share of U.S. production would be somewhat higher and our share of world markets somewhat 
lower because one of our major competitors, Brazil, exports most of her soybeans in the form of 
meal and oil. 
There is a "good news-bad news" quality to the shift in relative importance of our exports. 
The good news is that sa 1 es of corn and soybeans as inputs to 1 i ves tock production will respond 
more to economic growth abroad than will sales of cotton and tobacco. The bad news is that when 
worldwide economic growth s 1 ackens as it has in the 1980s, our export markets wi 11 suffer more 
than if they were dominated by cotton and tobacco. 
It should be clear from the statistics I have cited that world markets no longer are a 
marginal factor in the U.S. agricultural economy--something to be accounted for only after all 
domestic issues have been considered. Those whose livelihoods depend upon U.S. corn and soybean 
markets today must give consideration to factors such as the size of the Russian grain crop, the 
levels of growth in per capita income in countries such as Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, and the 
Common Agri cu ltura 1 Po 1 icy of the European Economic Community. It no 1 anger is adequate to 
concentrate on traditional domestic considerations such as acreage, weather, livestock demand, 
and the like. 
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Let me pro vi de some specific examples of some of the more significant changes that have 
occurred during the past 2C years. In the 1960s the European Economic Community (EEC) was of 
interest to U.S. farmers because of its market potential. Today, even though we still maintain 
substantial exports to the EEC our interest is focused much more on how its exports of wheat and 
dairy products interfere with our sales to other nations. 
India, a recipient in the 1950s and 1960s of much of the U.S. P.L. 480 largesse, is now 
struggling with the problem of storing and exporting surplus wheat. Whether this will be a 
long-term condition or is simply a short-term aberration remains to be seen. 
Thailand is a major competitor influencing sales of u.s. feed grains in Europe and rice in 
Asia. The Soviet Union was an exporter of grain in the 1950s. Today, with expanded levels of 
income and with the change in national policy discussed earlier, she is a leading importer. 
Because of the unpredictability of her import demand due both to weather and political 
considerations, she also is a major source of year-to-year instability in world markets. 
Indeed, one reality of today's world is that 95 percent of international wheat sales involve 
a state trader on at least one side of the transaction. Thus, our continued reliance on private 
traders places us definitely in the minority. This need not cause us to change our system but 
the predominance of state trading adds still further uncertainty to behavior of customers and 
competitors. 
A number of the nations mentioned in the last few paragraphs are less developed nations. 
Some such as Korea and Taiwan fall in a category called Newly Industrialized Countries or "NICs." 
Because U.S. farmers often are critical of U.S. assistance to developing nations, especially 
assistance relating to increased agricultural productivity, I want to comment about these nations 
briefly. 
I mentioned above the transition of Germany from an importer of poultry to an importer of 
feed grains and soybeans. A similar phenomenon accompanies the economic growth of less developed 
nations. In the early stages of development it is important for most countries to increase 
productivity of their agricultural sector. Such development often reduces the need for imports 
of commodities such as wheat and rice. But as has beeon clearly shown in the case of Korea, 
Taiwan, and a few other nations, this reduction in agricultural inputs is temporary. As 
development takes off the desire to consume and the ability to buy higher priced foods such as 
animal products leads to significantly increased demand for U.S. feedstuffs for animal 
production. My California colleagues anticipate that it will also lead to expanded markets for 
fresh fruits and vegetables in much the same fashion as occurred in the United States and Europe 
20 and 30 years ago. One of the issues that will he-lp determine whether we share in these 
expanded markets is the degree to which we and other nations move toward agricultural policies 
that encourage rather than discourage trade. 
The large number of nations whose actions affect the level of our exports illustrates why 
the state of our agricultural economy has become much less amenable to change by actions of our 
own government. Agricultural policies traditionally have been designed to shield domestic 
producers and consumers from some of the instability that characterizes agri cul tura 1 markets. In 
effect we, the Russians, the European Economic Community, and others have attempted to export our 
domestic price instability. It is generally accepted that prices and supplies in international 
markets have become even more unstable than would be the case in the absence of domestic 
policies. The United States as the world's leading trader in agricultural commodities is 
particularly vulnerable to unstable international prices. There can be little doubt, for 
example, that international price instability is partially responsible for the increased cost of 
operating traditional price and income support programs in the 1980s. 
Although the subject of domestic economic policies is not part of my topic I comment on them 
briefly because of their importance to our international performance. 
Our ability to compete in the international markets of the 1980s depends at least as much on 
the level of the dollar in foreign exchange as it does on the domestic price of our products. In 
fact, because of the rising value of the dollar our farm exports increased in cost to foreign 
buyers even as domestic prices declined the last few years. The resulting decline in exports of 
both agricultural and nonagricultural commodities and the increase in imports has led to record 
trade deficits for the United States. Continuation of the trade deficits of recent years when 
combined with massive deficits in federal spending constitutes a serious threat to agriculture's 
and society's long-term economic welfare. 
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Agriculture makes a relatively minor contribution to the federal deficit and it is a major 
positive force in reducing the size of the trade deficit. Nevertheless, agriculture's stake in 
the correction of these twin deficit problems is at least as great as that of any other sector of 
the economy. 
Conclusion 
The mind-boggling complexity of the modern economic world leads to suggestions that we 
return to the conditions of the 1950s when life was simpler and agriculture went its own way with 
relatively little regard for external conditions inside or outside the United States. 
Unfortunately that option no longer exists. Imagine for a moment the problems associated with an 
agricultural establishment whose planted acreage is reduced by 25 percent from present levels. 
This is what would be required to allow for that portion of our output that is exported. Or, 
imagine the problems of our economy without the benefit of agriculture's $30 +billion of foreign 
exchange earnings. What other sector would be capable of generating a similar sum to offset our 
imports of oil, automobiles, and television sets? 
Like it or not, we are going to have to find ways of living in an interdependent world. For 
agriculture and for all citizens this means gaining a better understanding of the benefits and 
costs associated with a world of interdependencies. For agricultural leaders it means working as 
hard for sound trade and domestic economic policies as for specific agricultural policies. The 
former may mean ntore to their constituencies today than the latter did in the 1950s. 
For example, policies designed to protect U.S. industry from imports could bP. un extremely 
damaging decision for agriculture. Federal deficits that are out of control and exorbitant 
levels of international debt could override the long-term, and even the short-term, benefits of 
even the best agricultural policies. The events of 1983-85 have amply demonstrated that rising 
target prices protected in four-year legislation cannot offset the farm income consequences of a 
dollar value in foreign exchange value that favors our competitors. 
We must be prepared to protect our self interest but self interest political behavior no 
longer is sufficient for our nation or for its agriculture. We must develop the capacity to 
understand the complexity of our international relations in both political and economic terms. 
We must develop the willpower to make the tough decisions that such understanding suggests. 
Among other things, we should take the lead in offering to negotiate broad provisions of domestic 
agricultural policy in the GATT or a similar forum. Perhaps we could begin by reaching some sort 
of bilateral or trilateral understanding with the European Community and Japan relating to the 
limits within which domestic policy will operate. Successful negotiations of this sort almost 
certainly will result in the fruits of our outstanding agricultural productive capacity being 
more widely shared among the nations of the world. 
As the 20th century draws to a close we and other nations must acknowledge and reflect in 
policy the fact that our economies are inextricably intertwined. We and they can profit from 
interdependence but only if we recognize the potential and adjust traditional behavior to achieve 
it. 
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STATUS OF THE 1985 FARM BILL 1 
Carl R. Zulauf 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, Ohio State University 
As the 1985 farm bill was not yet law at the time of writing this paper, specific prov1s1ons 
cannot be discusseQ with confidence. However, the HousP. and Senate each passed its version of the 
farm bill. It is possible to examine these two bills for broad areas of agreement and tc discuss 
their potential implications for U.S. agriculture. For brevity, my observa-t:ions are confined to 
four areas of agreement: (1) conservation programs; (2) export enhancement programs; (3) 
"self-help" programs; and (4) loan rates/target prices. 
Before discussino these areas, I address a cuestion asked by many farmers and others: why 
did the bill take so fong? The rPasons are helpful i~ understanding why the House and Senate farm 
bills were drafted as they were. 
Why the Farm Bill Took so Long 
Reasons for the delay are many, but three stand out: (1) continuing deterioration in the 
farm credit situation; (2) failure of the Reagan Administration to present a viable farm bill; and 
(3) budget constraints. A brief discussion of each follows. 
Farm Credit Crisis 
Although somP observers had warned of the fi nanc i a 1 prob 1 ems facing ag ri culture , the farm 
credit crisis did not become part of the nation a 1 agenda until Sen a tor Me 1 cher of Montana he 1 d 
hearings in Washington, D.C., in February 1985. A subsequent filibuster over the nominBtion of 
Edwin Meese to be Attorney General paved the way for the Senate and House to pass a farm credit 
assistance package aimed at assuring farmers credit for planting. 
President Reagan vetoed the credit relief bill, but farm credit was on the national agenda. 
Congress could not ignore the interrelationship hetween the farm bill and the credit crisis. 
Importantly, the farm bill assumed not only its traditional price and income suppo1·t role but also 
~credit relief role. Congress had to consider what impact reducing government support would have 
on the credit situation. 
Preoccupation of Congress with the farm credit cns1s during February caused the Senate ar.d 
House Agricultural Committees to postpone hearings on the farm bill by at least one month. From 
the very beginning, wrrk on the farm bill started late. 
Administration's Farm Bill 
The traditional start to markup (i.e., write) the farm bill is the Secretary of Agriculture's 
testimony before Congress presenting the Administration's farm bi 11. This year's traditional 
start was in most respects without meaning. The administration's farm bill, "The agricultural 
Jl.d_iustment Act of 1985," was a radical program that essentially moved agriculture to a free market 
over a six year period. Most farm groups and farm state legislators labeled the program reckless 
and irresponsible. It went too far, too fast, in their eyes, and would increase the financial 
difficulty facing farmers. 
Whatever the merits of the Administration's position, it was dead on departure as far as 
political realities were concerned. The administration undermined much of its influence over the 
farm bill by proposing and maintaining such an extreme position. It provided 1 ittle initial 
foundation for marking up a farm bill. Both the Senate and House Agricultural Committees chose as 
their markup vehicles the bills submitted by their respective chairmen, Senator Helms and 
Representative de la Garza. The result was further delay in writing the farm bill. 
1At the time of the seminar Professor Zulauf was on leave from Ohio State University, working in 
Senator John Glenn's Washington, D.C. office. He spoke to the seminar audience from there. This 
text was updated later, reflecting the House and Senate bills that went to a conference committee. 
Dr. Zulauf credited Kathy Connolly and David Dyer for assistance in writing this paper. 
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It should be noted, though, that the muc;h maligned "Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1985" 
proposed lowering loan rates and setting them through a moving average of market prices, and both 
proposals will be in the final farm bill. 
Budget Constraints 
The federal deficit of around $200 billion annually has surfaced as a major national agenda 
item. In 1985, Congress took a significant step at least to control further increases in the 
deficit. The "Budget Resolution for Fiscal Year 1986" called for cuts of $55 billion in federal 
spending. While most experts believe the actual cuts will be $35-40 billion, the fact is that 
Congress got serious about cutting federal spending in order to narrow the deficit. 
Meanwhile (at seminar time) a Congressional conference committee was considering a far more 
comprehensive budget reduction package. The so-called "Gramm-Rudman" approach would automatically 
ba 1 ance the budget by 1991 through across the board cuts in most federa 1 programs, exc 1 ud i ng 
antipoverty and social security programs. Passage of Gramm-Rudman could force reductions in farm 
price and income supports no matter what the provisions of the 1985 farm bill may turn out to be. 
Farm programs no longer enjoy an open checkbook. The Budget Resolution allocated about $35 
billion over the 1986-88 fiscal years for farm income and price support programs. This figure 
amounts to an average annual expenditure in excess of 40 percent of average annual net farm income 
over the last three years. However, the $35 billion amounts to a cut of $6-8 billion in outlays 
if current programs were to be continued. Thus, it represents a significant constraint on farm 
program expenditures. 
Budget constraints have caused substantial disagreement over how farm programs should operate 
in an era of tightening fiscal control, and over how the projected costs of the 1985 farm bill 
should be contained. These points of debate, along with the farm credit crisis and the 
Administration's farm bill stance, substantially slowed progress of the farm bill through 
Congress. 
Selected Common Themes in the House and Senate Farm Bills 
Strong Conservatinn Programs 
A common feature of the House and Senate farm bills was a strong commitment to soil 
conservation. Both bills contained sodbuster and swampbuster provisions. These provisions deny 
farm program benefits to farmers who break-out (plant crops on) newly cultivated lands designated 
as highly erodible or wetlands. Program benefits are denied for all crops produced, not just 
those produced on the broken-out erodible lands or wetlands. 
The bi 11 s wou 1 d a 1 so require farmers to apply accepted conservation practices on a 1 ready 
cultivated land designated as erodible or risk losing farm program benefits. The Senate bill 
requires approved practices to be in place by 1988 while the House bill sets 1995 as the 
compliance date. 
Lastly, the two bills contain a long term conservation reserve for fragile land already in 
crop production. The reserve will be at least 25 million acres. Farmers will bid for a per acre 
payment in return for removing the land from production for at least seven years. Payment will 
most likely be in cash but some could he in commodities, according to the House bill. The 
Secretary of Agriculture would also provide aid for up to 50 percent of the cost of installing 
approved cover crops or conservation practices. 
Public support for strong conservation measures has increased since the erosion impact of 
fence-row-to-fence-row planting was felt in the late 1970s. Their inclusion in the 1985 farm bill 
primarily represents the efforts of conservation groups such as the American Farmland Trust, 
Audubon Society, and Sierra Club. Although many farm groups climbed on board the conservation 
freight train in 1985, they were basically minor players in what will probably be the most novel 
program in the farm bill. 
Taken as a group, the conservation provisions represent a return to the philosophy of the 
farm programs of the 1930s . Farmers as a group are expected to practice good soil stewardship in 
return for federal farm program benefits. The conservation provisions also illustrate that new 
thrusts in farm 1 egis 1 a ti on normally have an i ncuba ti on period of five to ten years before the 
national agenda allows commitment to them. 
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Strong Export Enhancement Programs 
Both the Senate and House farm bills contain a strong commitment to export enhancement. Both 
reauthorize the Food for Peace program (P.L. 480) and increase its size. Both reauthorize 
the short term export credit guarantee program and reauthorize and broaden the intermediate term 
(three to ten year) export credit rrogram. Both bills also direct the Secretary of Agriculture to 
carry out an export payment-in-kind program and to use commodity export assistance to counter 
subsidies offered by foreign competitors. 
The strong export market development programs reflect a consensus among Congressional and 
Administration leaders that export enhancement programs offer a substantial method to boost 
demand, thereby reducing burdensome surpluses and increasing net farm income. The aggressive 
stance also reflects gr·owing Congressional concern over the inroads foreign producers have made 
into traditional United States markets for farm as well as industrial and other commodities. As 
far as export enhancement programs are concerned, agriculture has benefited from the very broad 
national concern now prevailing over the trade imbalance. 
The export programs in the farm bill will result in an increase in the proportion of farm 
exports shipped under some form of federal assistance. In fiscal year 1984, 15 percent of 
agricultural exports were shipped under either P.L. 480 or Commodity Credit Corporation credit 
programs. It is highly possible this proportion could rise to one-fourth or more of U.S. exports 
over the next three years. 
Self-Help Programs 
During the last quarter century, an increasing number of producer-funded checkoffs have been 
established for different agricultural commodities at the national or state level. These 
checkoffs fund research and market promotion efforts. The 1985 farm bill as drafted represents a 
major addition to this legacy. It contains provisions concerning national checkoffs for beef and 
pork. Furthermore, responding to suggestions from the major beef and pork commodity 
organizations, the producer referendum to certify the checkoff will be delayed until at least one 
year after the checkoff begins. The argument is that this delay gives producers a chance to judge 
the effectiveness of the checkoff. 
These two referendums reinforce what I see as a growing trend among public officials and 
representatives to ask agriculture to help itself. Checkoffs are one aspect of self-help. 
Another is producer assessments (taxes) to he 1 p finance commodity price support programs. The 
no-net-cost tobacco program and the recently completed dairy diversion program are examples. The 
House bill contains an extension of this approach by authorizing a producer tax to cover the cost 
of a whole-herd dairy buyout program, another dairy diversion program, and the cost of purchasing 
surplus milk above 5 billion pounds. 
The trend to ask agriculture to help itself can be traced in part to the increasing cost of 
government income and price support programs. It can also be traced to the fact that farmers are 
becoming fewer and larger. Furthermore, large farmers acquire the largest share of farm program 
benefits. Increasingly, questions are being asked such as whether large farmers need federal help 
and, even if they do, should it be extended given their size? A producer self-help program is one 
answer to these questions, as producers are taxed in proportion to the benefits they receive from 
federal programs. 
Loan Rates and Target Prices 
Both the Senate and House farm bi 11 s continue the current nonrecourse 1 oan programs. For 
wheat, feed grains, cotton, and rice, loan rates will decline but no more than five percent per 
year. Eventually, the loan rate would be set at 75-85 percent of the five year moving average of 
market prices minus the high and low price. In addition, both bills permit the Secretary of 
Agriculture to further reduce the loan rates through either a marketing loan or "Findley" 
adjustment. The Findley adjustment allows the Secretary to reduce the loan rate if the Secretary 
determines lower loan rates are needed to maintain price competitiveness. Both bills give the 
Secretary discretionary authority to use the Findley adjustment. 
The Senate farm bill requires the Secretary to offer a marketing loan. Under this prov1s1on, 
commodity loans could be repaid at a rate lower than the nonrecourse loan rate. The House bill 
makes a marketing loan optional at the Secretary's discretion. 
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Lastly, the House bill sets a $250,000 limitation on nonrecourse loans; none exists in the 
Senate bill. As an aside, the soybean loan rate will also decline but, given the substantial 
differences between the Senate and House farm bills, the soybean program will have to be worked 
out by the farm bill conference committee. 
The Senate bill contains a one year continuation of 1985 target prices. For 1987 and later 
crops, target prices can drop by up to five percent a year. However, in 1987 the Secretary is 
required to make up any reduction in target prices with payment-in-kind of government-owned 
commodities, and in 1988 the Secretary must pay up to five percent of the target price with 
commodities, to the extent they are available. Thus, the Senate bill effectively has a two year 
target price freeze. 
The House bill has a two year target price freeze at 1985 1 eve 1 s. Up to a five percent 
annual reduction is permitted for 1988 and later crops, but only if the cost of production 
declines at least five percent from the previous year. Most experts agree this translates into a 
five year freeze (the House bill covers five crop years). 
Both bi 11 s rna i nta in the $50,000 1 imit on deficiency payments, except that the Senate b i 11 
abo 1 i shes the 1 i mit for cotton and rice. Exc 1 uded from the payment 1 imitation are any payments 
that come from discretionary reduction in loan rates by the Secretary of Agriculture or payments 
under a marketing loan. 
The net effect of likely loan rate and target price provisions in the farm bill would be: 
( 1) 
( 2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
loan rates would decline over the foresP.eable future; 
given current surplus production and the inelastic short term demand for agricultural 
commodities, market prices would decline as loan rates decline; 
maximum possible deficiency payment per bushel or pound of commodity would increase as 
loan rates decline and target prices remain frozen, even if only for one year; 
the increasing maximum deficiency payment would increase budgetary exposure, at least in 
the short term; 
increasing budget exposure would bring pressure for either larger land set-asides or, if 
Gramm-Rudman passes, reductions in target prices beyond those specified in the farm 
bill. 
The end result is that farm income will come under pressure from declining market prices, 
increasing land set asides, and potential cuts due to Gramm-Rudman. This conclusion stems not so 
much from the specific form of the 1985 farm bill as from the current surp 1 us production situation 
and increasing national concern over the budget deficit. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The 1985 farm bill, if enacted in line with House and Senate bills, will confirm the old 
adage that farm policy is evolutionary, not revolutionary. The basic mechanisms in the bill will 
be the same as in the 1981 law. But the 1985 bill has its novel features teo. The conservation 
programs represent a strcng return to the idea that farmers as a group should practice good soil 
management in return for federal assistance. Furthermore, a major decision has been made: for 
better or worse, farm policy will be more market oriented. This is the same decision as was made 
in the 1950s and the 1960s. 
The bottom 1 i ne is that the 1985 farm bi 11 wi 11 pro vi de producers ex peri enci ng fi nanci a 1 
stress a "window of opportunity" for at least one year, probably two, but not more than four, 
during which to address their problems. National preoccupation with the budget deficit means the 
level of farm support will have to decline in the near future. ~'ith surp'lus production, that 
unfortunately translates into lower farm income. 
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COMMENTS ON THE STATUS OF LEGISLATION 
Harold D. Guither 
Policy Specialist, Extension Service, USDA and 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
University of Illinois 
Carl Zulauf has outlined very well the situation regarding ~tl"iting a 1985 farm bill. I add 
only a couple of footnotes . Regarding cargo preference, when we recognize what harpened in the 
House we can say that we got about as good a compromise as might be expected. The combined 
strength of the maritime unions and maritime ship owners was greater than agricultural interests 
could counter in the House. It would have been a windfall to maritime interests to have applied 
cargo preference to all exports involving any kind of government guarantee or government support, 
in view of the expected increase in blended credit and other export enhancement programs. As Dr. 
Zulauf said, only the PL 480 exports will be covered under the compromise plan, if the bill 
becomes law. There is an issue, though, about whether the appropriation for cargo preference cost 
(all, not just PL 480) will come out of the Department of Transportation budget or the CCC. 
The Harkin bill. Zulauf ' s comments are correct. I add only that it is sometimes said that 
Congress is not getting the signals about the Harkin approach, but in my view Congress is getting 
mixed signals. Some groups favor a farmer referendum for "farmer approved programs" that could 
result in mandatory acreage control or the marketing certificate program as passed by the House 
committee (in the Bedell amendment that was removed in House floor debate). But in the House 
debate more organizations were opposed than in favor of both the Bedell and the Alexander 
amendment th at in effect was equivalent to the Harkin bill. The vote was rather overwhelming. 
My own observation is that feed grains were thf! problem in the marketing certificatP and to 
some extent the Harkin bill. In an effort to restrict acreage of grains (feed grains 
particularly), and providing (in the certificate plan) for restrictions on where a non-participant 
could sell his grain, the fact comes into view that somewhere around half of all corn sold off 
farms goes to another farmer or feeder. The higher price to the farmer selling the corn would be 
a higher cost to the feeder buying it. I think that is where the opposition to the Bedell 
amendment originated. (Seven of Georgia's nine Congressmen voted against the Bedell amendment; 
their poultry constituents must have got word to them that they did not want a Bedell amendment in 
the bill.) 
The Farm Bureau was against the Bedell amendment, and the wheat and corn growers and the 
soybean association. Favoring it were Farmers Union, NFO, AAM, and a few other groups. 
Another feature of debate over various parts of the farm bill is that it is essentially 
nonpartisan. Pos1tions tend to be somewhat regionally and commodity centered. 
I have a list of issues to be resolved, if there is to be a 1985 farm bill before Christma!. 
(1) Target prices. Will there be a 1-year, 2-year, or 4-year freeze? (2) Closely related is 
the budget exposure that goes with target prices. The House has a 2-year freeze with a 5 percent 
reduction permitted, provided the Secretary of Agriculture can prove that costs of production have 
gone down that much. The Senate is talking about a 4-year freeze. (3) The marketing loan 
concept -- the idea that a CCC loan can be repaid at market prices. One object is to avoid 
accumulating stocks in the CCC. But a question arises about budget cost if the market price is 
very far below the loan. (4) The farmer referendum issue I commented on above. This will be 
around for consideration in future farm bills. (5) The dairy program and where compromise could 
come. (6) The conservation reserve. This is the most original part of the bills now being 
considered. The main difference between House and Senate is the term of the contract. The House 
calls for 10 years; the Senate is considering flexible 8-15 years. It's not possible to get land 
out of crops and into grass instantly, and there will be questions of defining the land that is 
eligible, and so on; but these are not the big issues. 
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RESPONSE TO LEGISLATION AND THE FARM SITUATION 
Burdette Frew 
President, MFA, Inc. 
When this session was planned it was hoped that a 1985 farm bill would have been passed. 
had no illusions. I am not even sure there will be one in January. What we probably will get is 
a band-aid approach to what we've got, and that's what we don't need. I will tell what I think we 
ought to have, from the standpoint of the farmer and agribusiness. Basically I comment from the 
agribusiness standpoint. It won't be possible to do what everybody wants --all the farmers, all 
agribusiness, anyone else -- in an industry that is as sick as agriculture is today. We can't 
satisfy all the people. The one thing that agribusiness, and cooperatives especially, will 
generally say, and that a private sector counterpart would add that he knows even better, is the 
truism that no industry that is overcapacity will be allowed to overproduce forever. A 
consolidation will take place. We can either go through it methodically, logically, orderly, 
strategically over time; or we can pick up what's left after the crash. A crash is going to 
happen; there's going to be a consolidation. 
MFA is a farm supply and marketing cooperative. We are one of many. We are about the 13th 
largest. There probably are too many farm supply cooperatives in the United StatPs today. We all 
vie for some of the same rna rket, although MFA is somewhat fortunate in that it pretty much enjoys 
control over its own market territory. But there is overcapacity. There is overcapacity in grain 
milling, in grain elevation and origination; and all this comes about because agriculture is 
overproducing for the market conditions we have today. The challenge seems to me to be very 
simple. We must develop a long run strategic plan that recognizes this and moves us toward a 
stable agricultural industry for this country. We can't do it alone. As a matter of fact, in my 
opinion there is no segment that can do it alone. If all the players involved are not willing to 
participate on an equal basis, I don't believe it can be done. 
What am I talking about? Agribusiness is going to have to bite the bullet to a greater 
degree than we have already bitten it. We are going to have to consolidate effort with one 
purpose in mind, and that is to lower the input costs to the farmer. That's got to be our driving 
force. Obviously, an adequate return on investment must come about at all levels, or there will 
not be an entity. So, therefore, agribusiness has to look at consolidation. 
I believe a part of the difficulty we face has been a poor approach by our legislators toward 
solving the problem that has existed since the 1930s. I'm not saying their heart was not in the 
right place. I am saying the kind of solutions that were arrived at were not the kind that will 
take us where we have to go over the long run. Therefore the administration in office, whoever it 
may be, must at some time develop a common view or objective that fits the strategy. And it must 
be perpetual; it can't change every four years. It can't go from embargo type mentality to "plant 
fence row to fence row, fo 1 ks, we've got to feed the world." There must be some consistency, from 
administration to administration, in the goals and objectives that agriculture must serve. 
That has to carry over in the Congress. Congress must finally realize the value of 
agriculture. Someone in the seminar asked, "The farm credit crunch was no surprise to farmers. 
Why was it a surprise to Congress?" I think the question demonstrates the lack of communication 
that exists between our government, including Congress, and the real farmer and his problem in the 
country. Therefore, realizing that we are only three percent of the population, or less, and that 
we have only a minor effect on the total budget of the federal government, I believe there has to 
be a good understanding of the value of agriculture and the contribution of the farmer -- an 
understanding held by both urban Congressmen and those from rural areas. 
My opinion is that our inexpensive food policy, followed over time, has accrued to the 
consumer. We must change to a more even balance, so that some of the benefits of policy accrue to 
the producer. 
There has to be a strong R&D effort. I am afraid that our R&D effort in agribusiness is 
diminishing. I do agree that the farmer must participate in some 'tlay in an R&D effort. I will 
explain why I feel that way, and feel strongly; and it must come about through some kind of a 
check-off program, I suppose, even though that is controversial. 
Heretofore, in my opinion, the technological improvements in production have accrued to the 
consumer. I believe that from here on out the improvements in production through technology ought 
to accrue to the producer, by 1 oweri ng his costs. So from here on out he wi 11 have an even 
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greater interest in research and development that relates to enabling him to reduce his input 
costs, with the target of retaining for himself more of the benefits. 
Then, obviously, we must get back to the matter of consolidation. We cannot continue to 
overproduce, and we all like to think that the farmer himself would be able to regulate that, to 
govern that. We would like to believe that, but I don't really believe it. I doubt anyone really 
believes that the individual farmer is capable of doing that. 
First of all, a difficulty arises because the farmer does not know what his target is. And 
secondly, we are a breed of entrepreneurs who sit around and scheme about how each can take 
advantage of a market condition that no one else sees. In some way we must approach some kind of 
control on production. 
One of the most important aspects of any legislation -- all of which must be a long term 
strategy -- is that it enable us to take our rightful place as an exporter, as a provider of the 
food the world needs. We want our proper market share. To accomplish that we cannot continue the 
pricing formulas and price levels that we now use. We cannot achieve our objective with them. We 
are constantly not competitive on the world market. This has to do with target prices, loan 
prices, a lot of different things. 
It is necessary that at some point in time we devise a system that assures that our grain is 
competitive on the foreign market. To be sure, I doubt this is possible without some 
subsidization. It will then be possible for us to exercise our ability to regain the market that 
was lost over the years. 
Another person has said, and I believe it to be true, that the Less Developed Countries are 
prime targets as customers, and we should do what we can to make sure we have a part of that 
trade. 
There probably are many more key aspects to a long term strategy that must come into play. 
Nevertheless, I believe it is not possible to drop out any one of the key elements of that 
strategy and accomplish what we hope to accomplish. I do not believe agriculture as an industry, 
the Administration, or the Congress has ever taken that kind of an approach to it. That's what 
business would do. Business would gather its resources, it would put together the resources 
necessary to develop the strategy, and then work to the end of fulfilling the needs of that 
strategy. Until now I think we have had a lot of push and pull and the results are easy to see. 
We are struggling with what we have at hand, and it is not working. To patch it up and band-aid 
it is not the answer. My comments are intended to prove the point that we are overproducing, we 
are overcapacity, and we can either take care of this problem systematically, strategically, or we 
can plan to pick it up after the crash as we did in the J930s. 
RESPONSE TO LEGISLATION AND THE FARM SITUATION 
Gary Hanman 
Executive Vice President and General Manager 
Mid-America Dairymen 
My objective is to explain what the dairy industry is trying to do to resolve its problems, 
and to ask whether our experience has any application to agriculture. 
Ever since the 1950s we in dairy have tried to set up some sort of governmental relations 
policy, or program, that is cooperative with other parts of agriculture but specifically designed 
for dairy -- taking into account the uniqueness of its markets, the perishability of its product, 
and the elasticity of its demand. What we have done basically in the dairy industry is to 
recognize that our market is domestic. We do not try to get into the world market. Most of the 
world's trading is subsidized and our government and our farmers have not been willing to subsidize 
our exporting into the foreign market. With that in mind we say we want to be able to protect our 
domestic market. In order to defend against subsidies and government assistance in some other 
dairying countries we have been able to pass and maintain some types of restrictions on entry into 
this country of foreign subsidized dairy products. l~e have a complicated system of quotas set up 
by country of origin, by product definition. Anyone who wants to bring dairy products into the 
United States must be in compliance with these controls. Our market is a domestic market. 
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We have also said in our dairy policy that price is our target. Recognizing what the 
domestic market is, we try to get a price and then let supply adjust to demand, holding to price 
as our target. In other words, we have not opted for, nor wou 1 d our present stand favor, 
combining loan rates, target prices, and deficiency payments. We have not given up on parity as a 
concept. Our proposal for the 1985 farm bill as written in the House contained a continuation of 
parity as a concept. It's really a cost-of-production adjuster, to move milk prices along with 
input costs. It called for modification by a supply-demand adjuster. We were saying that we 
thought we knew what the price 0ught to be but we might not be able to hit it right on the head, 
so the price can be modified according to what the CCC buys. If the CCC buys too much the price 
will come down a little, and if it doesn't buy much it will go up a little. 
The third point of a program is an attempt to tailor supply to existing demand and not use 
price alone as a mover to do it. We call it a self-help incentive plan. Two features are a 5-30 
percent paid diversion wherein a dairy farmer who wants to sign up for two years to reduce his 
production would get $10.00 a cwt. for those pounds he cid not produce. The other option in the 
bill is a whole-herd buy-out. A dairy farmer could sign up to stay out of production for three 
years, bidding on a cwt. basis on production history as to what price he would ask to do that --
to idle that production facility. The theory is that if a milk barn is removed from production 
for three years, it is not likely ever to come back into production. 
Our supply control, then, is CCC purchases, with some price as a mover, with the voluntary 
supply control mechanism. Farmers are eligible to sign up for 5-30, or for whole-herd, but they 
do not have to. Cost of the program wou 1 d be funded by dairy farmers themselves. Those who do 
not sign up will help fund it for those who do, basically. Every dairy farmer will fund it. We 
hope to fund it and get supplies in line with demand for 50 cents a cwt., which compares with a 
support price for manufacturing grade milk of about $11.60. 
With regard to the demand side of the market -- our own domestic market for which we produce 
-- we have devised some unique plans and systems whereby we can take advantage of the uniqueness 
of the demand curve for the fluid milk products (those we drink). That ' s about half of our 
market, and we can increase the price on that side of our business without suffering reductions in 
sales, and thereby net more dollars for farmers. So in the 1930s the industry put in federal milk 
marketing orders which split out the fluid side and premium-priced it, giving the money back to 
farmers and enhancing thf! price mechanism. The other side is manufactured products, which is 
essentially supported by the support program. These are two different typ~s of programs, 
splitting the domestic market that has been isolated. 
Why, further, is dairy different? We think we are different from the rest of agriculture in 
three ways. First, 80 percent of all the milk that moves off our dairy farms moves through dairy 
marketing cooperatives such as the one I work for, Mid-America Dairymen. For a large commodity 
such as milk -- in contrast with walnuts or pecans -- that is a high percentage. Milk is produced 
in almost every Congressional district in the United States. And 80 percent of it is organized. 
Of those dairy marketing cooperatives, about 95 percent work together at the national level 
through the Natioral Milk Producers, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, CLUSA, or some other 
organization to put together our national legislative program and then to support it. So we have 
an organization, we have most of the milk. 
Thirdly, and most recently, these organizations have become very politically active. And 
they do not just relate to agricultural Congressmen and Senators. We have or9anized PACs 
(Po 1 it i cal Action Committees). We have gone to our dairy farmer members and have asked thP.m to 
give this committee some money with which to e 1 ect our friends and defeat our enemies, if you 
please. And, surprisingly, when we started our boards were saying it cannot be done. It is not 
possible tu go to famers and ask for $100 without telling them what will be done with the money. 
But we went, and they paid. More than half of our 11,000 dairy farmer members contribute up to 
$200 a year to our PAC. Our PAC will generate $700,000 a year to be used in political processes 
to educate Congressmen and Senators on what farmers want. As an example, when we went to the 
House with our "dairy unity bill" with its five points that I mentioned above, the Administration 
was against us and, incidentally, rr,ost of the major farm organizations were against us. When we 
came down to the fi na 1 vote we only passed it with 75 votes. We will pass it before we get 
through, we think. 
Does what we have done in dairy have any meaning for all aoriculture? Can we take what we 
have done ; n da; ry and say, one' "Have you been succes sfu 1? II and' two' II If you have, can you 
apply it to the rest of agriculture?" 
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First, we have obviously not been totally successful. We must recoanize the limitation of 
not having any effective supply control. A beef farmer can become a dairy farmer if he wants to. 
A wheat man can put in a milk barn. There are some limitations to entry, though. It takes a 
substantial amount of capital to get into the dairy business, and the investment is highly 
specialized -- for production only of milk. When Dr. Bartlett at the University of Illinois 
advised that anyone not liking dairying should get out of it and use the resources for something 
else, one of our members asken him if he had ever tried to raise hogs in an elevr.t.ed milk parlor . 
A milking area doesn't make very good farrowing crates. 
Nevertheless, despite some barriers to entry we found in the early 1980s when milk prices 
were going up three to five percent every six months and prices in the rest of agriculture were 
being pulled down by deflation and the world situation, and feed costs were going down, we built 
up some tremendous surpluses. We are in the same soup again. So we have to work within the total 
environmert of agriculture. But on a relative basis we can probably do better than some other 
enterprises. 
Basically this is what we have done in dairy. Will something similar work for all 
agriculture? Probably not. Net all agriculture can say, "We are going to produce just for the 
domestic market." Much of agriculture has to produce for export. But maybe we can take a look at 
some of the domestic uses and examine the demand elasticity and segregate those favorable outlets, 
premium pricing for them and blending the proceeds over all growers. 
Secondly, I agree with Mr. Frew that we have too many acres in production of row crops. We 
are productive on those acres, obviously, so we must idle some land. The whole agricultural 
production machine has got to be scaled back to conform to demand. I don't know how many acres 
will need to come out but I'd guess somewhere between 70 million and 110 million. Some kind of 
aggressive land retirement program is necessary. I'd like to call it a conservation reserve, to 
be set aside for food production for my grandchildren. Meantime, if I want to go out from the 
city and hunt pheasants on the idled 1 and, I can do so. Some type of pub 1 i c 1 and use program is 
desirable wherein we set the land aside as a reserve for the future but keep it from being a 
depressant on the market, rather like the federal forests. I believe this makes sense. 
Thirdly, ~e have to recognize that government expenditures are limited. If we thirk we can 
go to Congress and get the kind of money some farm programs would call for, $10 or $15 or $30 
billion over budget allocation, or if we expect half of our income to come from the government, we 
are whistling Dixie. It's not possible to continue to do that. Some money can be extracted but 
not those big figures. We need to find out what size of budget appropriation is feasible, build 
that in, adjust our supply to what our demand is, and then try to set up a mechanism, with 
government assistance, whereby we can do that ourselves. I have in mind some kind of 
government-assisted, government-sponsored, government-encouraged arrangement, maybe along 
commodity lines, to do the marketing, and the production system, and the R&D that Mr. Frew has in 
mind. 
Last but not least, dairying has rer.ently gone to self help advertising and promotion. We 
initiated a program at 15 cents a cwt. that generated $200 million and I hope everyone is seeing 
on TV and hearing on radio the advice to drink milk and eat cheese, which are good for you, it's 
good food, and so on. WE' set up the activity without consumers on the board, without industry 
either. Only those who contributed are on the board. We put it in without a referendum, and 
without an ask-out that would enable a contributor to get his money back. We said, "Give us a 
year and we will prove it will work, and then you can ask farmers whether they like it or not." 
We have just had a referendum, and 90 percent of the farmers said they want to continue it. We 
now have a program that will continue for at least a while that provides $200 million for 
research, public relations, market enhancement, and the whole ball of wax. Some of us believe that 
might be the forerunner to the type of program that some other commodities could use. 
32 
RESPONSE TO LEGISLATION AND THE FARM SITUATION 
Robert Hitzh.usen 
Director of National Legislative Programs 
Missouri Farm Bureau Federation 
I will take a quick journey through the Farm Bureau policy relative to the 1985 farm bill, 
reporting the progress up to mid-November. We are noted in the farm community as a conservative 
farm voice. Some other farm groups are less conservative than we are. Two or three years ago a 
very definite opinion was forming in the minds of Farm Bureau members along about these lines : 
"Farm programs have been around for 50 years. We certainly have not gotten prosperous under farm 
programs, we have not stopped the decline in farm numbers under farm programs, so it's time we 
start phasing out of this mess." We were strong in terms of looking at a three or four or five 
year phase-out where we could begin to get out of farm programs as much as possible. Then an 
interesting thing happened on the way to a 1985 farm bill. When the farm economy went extremely 
sour, Farm Bureau members changed their tune ever so slightly but in significant ways. They then 
said, "Yes, we still have a long-term goal of getting out of farm programs and go back to where we 
are responding more to market signals, but 1985 is not the time to do that." Our people made some 
very significant changes in their attitudes in that two or three year period. So when we started 
the 1985 year and the farm bill was up for discussion, we found ourselves in a rather interesting 
position -- one we are not often in -- a middle of the road position. We found the Administration 
had taken up the chant of getting rid of farm programs, phasing them out. Some other farm groups 
said they wanted more government, more opportunity to try to control production. Farm Bureau 
found itself in a no-man's-land, the middle, saying, "Yes, as a long term goal we'd like to move 
in that direction but we need to keep some of the price support mechanisms in place at least for 
the next four or five years to get through these tough times." 
It's interesting to note that the farm bill that is being hammered out in Congress this fall 
looks very much like the Farm Bureau farm bill. I wish I could tell you that the reason this is 
true is that we are so effective as lobbyists, that we went in and we got everything we wanted. 
Unfortunately, I don't think that is the case . I think Congress has run into the same thing we 
ran into as an organization. We are essentially, in our policy process, a miniature Congress. By 
the time we get to our annual meeting we have a whole group of voting delegates who are trying to 
compromise, and argue, and come up with something that everybody can live with. That process does 
not lead to some grand new extreme change in farm policy, but a compromise that more or less suits 
everybody. That's what we ended up with, and that is what Congress has been headed for. Congress 
has been close to where we were at the start of the year, and has found it necessary to do the 
same compromising and changing that we did. 
We need to think about expectations . We have been hearing from a 1 ot of people who began 
with elevated expectations as to what they could or could not do with regard to a 1985 farm bill. 
That has been true not only in the farm community but in Congress. Congressmen ran around making 
a lot of promises, and started work on the bill earlier than I have ever seen them start on any 
major piece of legislation. Congress was holding hearings in 1984. The amount of lead time given 
was unprecedented. 
We could say now that never have so many toiled so long to produce so little. This remark is 
a bit negative but probably correct. Congress started out with grand expectations. A lot of 
people in the farm community got swept up in the idea that somehow the 1985 farm bill was going to 
save us, that we could find the answer there that would take us out of agriculture's problems. 
Our expectations got us into a lot of difficulty, as they were not realistic as to what that 
piece of legislation could do. Dr. Learn has observed -- a good statement -- that farm groups 
would do well to concentrate on sound trade and economic policies that may be even more important 
than specific farm policy legislation. 
In other words, we could look at the farm bill as relatively minor. I don't mean that it is 
un important. But if we look at the trade imbalance, if we look at the $200 billion fiscal 
deficit, if we look at tax reform measures that are necessary in order to help agriculture, if we 
look at trade policies that are necessary to help agriculture, how can we possibly depend on one 
bill to solve all our problems? 
I'm not a Biblical scholar but we can make an analogy with a line from the New Testament that 
refers to the peep 1 e who have a tendency to choke on a gnat and swallow a came 1. I use the 
analogy loosely, but when we hear people say we have lost the 1985 farm bill because it doesn't 
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totally solve farmers' problems -- it doesn't provide the income or generally solve the problems 
-- I think they are choking on that gnat and at the same time are swallowing the camel of $200 
billion deficits and the other national economic problems that are much greater than farm program 
legislation and must be addressed in a much broader sense . 
I will not comment on a couple of issues of current interest and will try to explain where we 
are as of mid-November. I don't mean to take exception with Dr. Zulauf but the only source of 
information on where the farm bill stands is Senator Dole's office. The 1985 farm bill rests in 
Senator Dole's hands. He is trying to put together a compromise that will get 51 votes on the 
Senate floor. If he proves unable to do that, there will be no 1985 farm bill. He is the main 
broker. 
As to the Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, he is a non-player. Senator Helms is 
more worried about tobacco, which has been pulled out of the farm bill this year. He is more 
active on matters far removed from a farm bill. 
Senator Dole has played the game of putting in anything that seemed likely to get votes on 
the Senate floor, so that a bill can be passed and go to conference. Senator Dole has had his 
lists of reasons why the farm bill has moved so slowly, but he left off what I regard as the major 
reason. It is the 1986 election. In working with members of the Missouri Delegation I find more 
antennas up in the air than I have ever seen before. It's frustrating. Members cannot talk about 
anything without worrying about what the pollsters are saying about 1986. Republicans want the 
Democrats to look like they are the bad guys. Democrats want Repub l icans to make the first move, 
and that's the fight over the Gramm-Rudman provision. Are cuts in budget to start before the 1986 
e 1 ecti ons or after them? Democrats want them before because they think the cuts wi 11 make the 
Republicans look worse, and so on. The farm bill has been wrapped up in that, the Gramm-Rudman 
issue is involved, and it's all intertwined. 
The new soybean proposa 1 for per-acre payments is an interesting deve 1 opment. I had kept 
telling soybean people that it did not stand a chance of being considered because, politically, 
it's too blatant, I said. You can't hand someone $50 an acre. You can confuse them with target 
prices and loan rates and deficiency payments and get $50 an acre but you can't just call it $50 
an acre and get it. But negotiating started with Senator Dole, and there has seemed to be a 
possibility that the Senator will include the per-acre payment in his compromise plan. I am 
learning that anything is possible in politics. If Senator Dole believes he can get more votes by 
having the provision in the bill he will put it in. Then it may mysteriously disappear in 
conference. 
It's worth noting, if we look at the soybean plan, that it points out some of the costs that 
we are facing today in farm programs that are sometimes overlooked. The figure of $50 an acre 
seems extremely costly. What the soybean people have been successful in doing is showing that 
that is actually cheaper than keeping things where they are now. If we leave the loan rate at 
$5.02, allowing a lot of beans to go into government storage, incurring costs of storage and 
trying to get rid of stocks, it's cheaper to lower the loan rate in exchange for paying the $50 an 
acre. The soybean people see a net savings under their plan. Even though it's blatant, it does 
make a very interesting point. Loan programs aren ' t costless either. Their costs are often 
overlooked by decision-makers in Washington. 
One final word. Mr. Hanman made a statement about what he called dairymen's political 
education efforts. If you doubt whether that process works, 1 ook at the cargo preference 
prov1s1on. I was in the House gallery when the House put the maritime union cargo preference 
language in the farm bill. I looked into the matter and found that three major maritime unions 
gave Congress $2! million in political contributions in the last election. 
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RESPONSE TO LEGISLATION AND THE FARM SITUATION 
Dan Jennings 
Sikeston farmer and state ASCS Committeeman 
All that has been said at this seminar is so bearish I feel I must report a piece of 
information our state ASCS office got from Washington. It's that the rate of decline in the farm 
economy is declining. In the situation today I guess that amounts to good news. And we need any 
good news we can get. 
I recognize that just about everyone has some notion of what should go into a 1985 farm bill 
(or 1986 or 1987 bill, whenever we finally get it). Down home we have written a farm bill several 
times, in our coffee shop. 
The one propos a 1 that makes most sense to me and, I be 1 i eve, offers some hope, is what has 
been called a marketing loan concept. It provides income protection, it allows the market system 
to work at whatever level it can work, it sends a very clear signal to Europeans that we are going 
to make our commodities competitive in a world market, it says that we are not going to sacrifice 
our farmers, and it adds that we are not going to support their farmers any longer either. I 
learned when in Europe last summer that without question the Europeans are very concerned that we 
are going to lower our loan rates and add additional cost as they support the very expe.nsive 
agriculture that they have. 
I think the marketing loan program offers some hope to agriculture. It offers an opportunity 
for profit, I believe. Also, it's not going to do any good to pass a farm credit bail-out if we 
do not pass a farm bill that gives us some hope for profitability in agriculture. 
A marketing loan program, as I understand it, would freeze the target level where it is. The 
loan rate would be held close to where it is now, and the farmer would be eligible to put his 
commodity under loan but he would repay the loan at the market price prevailing at the time of 
repayment. If, for example, corn went under loan at $2.60 a bushel and the market price stayed at 
$2.20, the farmer would have the option of paying the government back $2.20. The market would 
flow. 
The way we are operating currently, we have a commodity going under loan, and by the time we 
pay elevator charges in and out, trucking charges and nine months' storage, the grain elevators 
and trucking companies together get 60 to 70 cents a bushel and the grain still has not been sold. 
It's only gone into a storage facility. I don't believe it does anyone any good for grain to end 
up in government hands. A marketing loan would stop that from happening. Government is not a 
market, but in 1985 the ASCS office has become the most active plar.e in a farming county. 
I am not sure whether under a marketing loan the loan rate would be frozen for four or five 
years. My tendency would be to do that but I might be negot i ab 1 e on that point. If the rna rket 
system is going to work, we will have to give it time to work. But most farmers don't have that 
much time. We are going to have to give them some support as we go through a transition period. 
My point is that it's costing the government 60 to 70 cents a bushel as payment on many bushels, 
and then the CCC may have to take over the commodity on forfeiture and pay storage costs for two 
or three more years. It seems to me it makes more sense to pay out government money directly 
rather than pay out so much to elevators and truckers. If the point of a farm program is to 
support farmers, the present system doesn't seem a viable system for doing that. 
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WHAT PROSPECTIVE CHANGES MAY MEAN FOR 
AGRICULTURE AND RURAL AMERICA 
Philip M. Raup 
Professor Emeritus, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics 
University of Minnesota 
Introduction 
In the fly-leaf to his famed Principles of Economics, Alfred Marshall inscribed the Latin 
motto, Natura non facit saltum -- nature does not make leaps. This was a fitting credo for an 
economist trained l"i1the full bloom of Darwinian thought i n the closing decades of the 19th 
century. It is not a motto that a contemporary economist would likely adopt. 
The Darwinian support for this sentiment is increasingly questioned in the biological and 
earth-sciences. Economic and social affairs since the birth of the age of petroleum have 
recorded changes that, while they may not be leaps, are certainly major discontinuities. We are 
currently faced with one of these periods of drastic change in the organization and structure of 
U.S. agriculture . Before attempting any speculations regarding the possible effects of these 
changes, a brief look is required at their roots and antecedents. 
Given the penchant for historical parallels, it is important at this point to recall that 
the current depression in agriculture is frequently compared to the trauma of the 1930s. This is 
wrong, and it may be dangerously misleading. The depression of the 1930s affected the entire 
economy -- some sectors more than others, but almost no sector escaped. The collapse of asset 
values in agriculture in the 1980s occurs in the presence of some booming sectors and regions, 
and in frequent proximity to suburban and rural non-farm life-styles that, if not booming, have 
managed to retain a vigor that only sharpens the contrast with farming neighbors. 
The comparison with the 1930s is wrong in a more telling dimension. Agriculture entered the 
1930s with an impaired physical plant, worn down by the decade-long agricultural retreat of the 
1920s. It emerged from the 1930s and the years of the Second World War with a structure of asset 
ownership, control, and management that was virtually identical with the structure of 1930. In 
the intervening years, all-time highs were recor·cted in 1935 in the number of farms, and in the 
absolute size of the farm population. The depression of the 1930s was associated with a 
migration into agriculture, and a reinforcement of its traditional structure. The major changes 
that were to set the stage on which agriculture performs in the 1980s were yet to come. 
Roots and Dimension of the Current Farm Crisis 
The contemporary crisis in rural America has many roots, but four can be singled out for 
particular emphasis. 
1. Generational change has given us a population in which the majority has no 
personal recollection of the history of past financial crises. 
2. Decision-making in agriculture was dominated for four decades by a preoccupation 
with capital gains and a neglect of cash-flow. Farmland values rose almost 
without interruption from the mid-1930s to 1981. 
3. Well-publicized world food shortages in the 1960s and 1970s created a belief in a 
virtually unlimited export demand for U.S. farm products. 
4. There was delayed recognition of the extent to which the United States had lost 
its position as a self-sufficient economy, was increasingly integrated into the 
world economy, and was being transformed from a creditor into a debtor nation. 
These four roots of rural crisis were fed by tax and fiscal policies that stimulated over 
investment in land, buildings, and equipment capital, and by monetary policies that contributed 
to real rates of interest that in the 1970s were the lowest and in the 1980s are the highest in 
more than a century. From 1973 to 1981 the real rate of interest on Federal Land Bank mortgages 
(the nominal rate minus the inflation rate) was negative in 18 of the 32 quarters. In effect, 
gasoline was poured on the fire of anticipated capital gains. 
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From 1971 to 1981 farmland values rose four-fold nationally and increased 4.5- to 5.5-fold 
in major grain-producing areas of the Midwest and Great Plains. The drop from 1981 to 1985 has 
exceeded any previous four-year decline in land values in the Grain Belt for which we have 
records. 
Nationally, from February 1981 to April 1985 farmland values fell 17 percent in nominal (i.e., current) dollars. In real terms (current dollars deflated by the CPI index), the decline 
from 1981 to 1985 was 30 percent. In the Corn Belt, Lake States, and Northern Plains declines 
were much more severe, as shown in Table 1. Declines on this scale have wiped out asset values 
and credit capacity to an extent that fully justifies the use of the term crisis to describe the 
agricultural situation. 
Table 1. Nominal and Real Declines in Farmland Values, Lake States, Corn Belt, 
Northern Plains, 1981-1985 
Jan.-June 1981 Aril 1985 Percent decline Nominal Deflated Nomina Deflated Nominal Deflated 
CPI Deflator 272 322 
(1967=100) 
dollars dollars dollars dollars percent percent 
---
Lake States 
Michigan 1,289 474 1,052 327 18 31 
Wisconsin 1,152 423 847 263 27 38 
Minnesota 1,281 471 823 256 36 46 
Corn Belt 
----
Ohio 1,831 673 1,126 350 39 48 
Indiana 2,031 747 1,259 391 38 47 
Illinois 2,188 804 1,314 408 40 49 
Iowa 1,999 735 1,064 330 47 55 
~issouri 990 364 659 205 33 44 
Northern Plains 
---
N. Dakota 436 160 360 112 17 30 
S. Dakota 329 121 250 78 24 36 
Nebraska 729 268 444 138 39 49 
Kansas 619 228 466 145 25 36 
u.s. ( 48 states) 819 301 679 211 17 30 
Source: A~ricultural [and Values and Markets, Economic Research Service, USDA, CD-90, 
August 198 , Table 2. 
The Deteriorating Shock-Absorbing Capacity of U.S. Agriculture 
Historically, the great strength of a farm structure composed of many relatively small units 
was the ability to absorb economic or weather-induced crises by suppressing fcmily 1 eve 1 s of 
living. When labor was a major input in farming, the willingness of producers to tolerate low 
1 abor returns measured their shock-absorbing capacity. Lint il the 1960s, 1 abor remained the 
largest single input cost in U.S. farming. Faced with economic adversity, large shocks could 
still be absorbed by underrewarding labor. The extent to which this option has been eroded is 
shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Percentage Distribution of Farm Inputs, 1910-1983 
Inputs involving 
production credi t 
Purchased 
Farm real feed, seed Ta xes , Mi scella-
Yea r Labor estate Machinery Chemicals livestock Subtotal interest nenus 
percentage of total, 1935-39 weights 
1910 53 . 4 20. 2 8 .5 1.7 3. 2 13.4 8.3 4.7 
1915 51.6 19.8 9.8 1.6 3. 0 14.4 9.3 4.9 
1920 50 . 0 18 . 5 11.8 2.1 3.9 17.8 8.8 4.9 
1925 48 .9 17.8 12.0 2.3 4.6 18.9 9.7 4.7 
1930 46.2 17.7 14.1 2.8 4.4 21.3 10.4 4.4 
1935 47.0 19 . 2 12.9 2.7 4.1 19.7 9.7 4. 4 
1939 42.8 18.4 14 . 7 3.4 6.2 24.3 10.3 4.2 
1947-49 weights 
1939 54 .4 17.0 10.1 1.9 6.5 18.5 7.0 3.1 
1945 48.0 15.8 14.3 3.2 8.2 25.7 7.4 3.1 
1950 38.1 16.7 20.3 4. 7 9.4 34.4 7.5 3.3 
1955 32.0 16.4 23.3 6.2 10.7 40.2 7.9 3.5 
1957-59 weights 
1955 32.2 19.4 24.0 4.4 9.0 37.4 7. 7 :3.2 
1960 26.5 19.4 25.0 5.8 10.9 41.7 8.6 3.8 
1965 20.4 19.7 24.9 9.1 12.5 46.5 9.4 4.0 
1967-69 weights 
1965 23.2 23.6 26.8 5.3 6.7 38.8 10 .8 3.5 
1970 19.0 23 .0 28.3 8.0 7.4 43.7 10.8 3.5 
1975 16.7 21.8 31.5 8.8 7.1 47.4 10.8 3.3 
1976 16.0 21.6 31.3 9.6 7.4 48.3 10 . 5 3.6 
1976-78 weights 
1975 17.1 24.1 33.0 8.0 6.2 47 . 2 8. 3 3.2 
1980 13.8 23.6 33.5 11.0 6.9 51.4 7.8 3.7 
1983 12.8 25.2 32.5 9.6 6.9 49.0 8.5 4. 6 
Source : National Economics Div i sion, Economic Research Service, USDA, Feb. 1985. 
The dominant problem facing agricultural producers in the mid-1980s is survival, and 
survival strategies have changed drastically. Underrewarding the labor input no longer offers 
much shock absorbing capacity. The labor share of input cost is too small, averaging 13 to 14 
percent in the 1980s for U.S. farming as a whole. In many cash-crop operations, the proportion 
falls to 5 percent or less. 
Some shock absorbing capacity exists in the possibility of varying fertilizer and chemical 
inputs, but together they accounted for only about 10 percent of the cost of total farm inputs in 
1983 . Taxes and interest costs are also significant, but in 1975-83 they were at about the same 
levels of relative importance as they were in 1910-20, i.e . , averaging about 8 to 9 percent of 
the cost of total inputs. 
The only two large items of input costs that can be varied in the 1980s to absorb economic 
shock are land costs, at about 25 percent of total costs, and mechanical and machinery expenses, 
which i n 1983 accounted for one-third of total input costs. 
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The largest fraction of current farm input costs is accounted for by mechanical equipment 
and farm machinery. Any attempts to cushion the shock of economic reverses in farming by 
reducing current expenditures must focus on this class of inputs. This is occurring. BankrJptcy 
and merger activity are prominent among farm machinery manufacturers, and farm machinery dealers 
are going out of business throughout the farm belt. Tractor manufacturers in the United States in 1983 operated at only 22 percent of capacity, and combine manufacturers at 14 percent of 
capacity (USDA, 1984, p. 31). In 1949, there were 1492 farm equipment dealers in Minnesota and South Dakot~; in 1984, only 600 were still in business (Austin, 1985). 
The rural farm economy, in short, is consuming capital. Income to labor and management has fallen to levels that cannot maintain family investment in human capital. The education and 
motivation of the next generation of farmers is being impaired, in ways that defy measurement but 
that could prove to be the most critical impairment of the capital stock of agriculture. 
Undermaintenance of building and machinery capital is widespread. This can be tolerated for 
a short time, but it will eventually be reflected in a failure to keep abreast of new developments in technology. If undermaintenance continues, rising costs and falling productivity 
are inevitable. 
Absorbing shock by under-rewarding labor and undermaintaining physical capital are the most 
obvious responses to the current financial crisis. A less visible but potentially more damaging 
response is to exploit the resource base through a neglect of soil and water conservation. The 
areas suffering most acutely in the current crisis include areas of the Corn Belt and Great Plains that are highly susceptible to water and wind erosion. This fact suggests that long run impairment of land and water capital is one of the greatest risks imposed by the traumatic fall in farming profitability in the past four years. 
These forms of absorbing shock by exhausting capital involve individual farms and families. A larger dimension of the process of "eating the seed corn," or living off of capital, involves 
the deterioration of rural communities. The most obvious consequence of the wipe-out of land 
values is a parallel wipe-out of the property tax base. This is a lagged effect, and the full impact has not yet been felt. 
Land value declines of 40 to 50 percent can only mean a reduced capacity to support public 
services in rural areas, and an increased burden on non-farm property. Mcst states in the areas 
of greatest farm distress have extensive programs of state aids to local governments, to maintain 
approximate equality of access to education, health care, and welfare. A sharp increase in the 
cost of these state aids to rural governments is sure to occur. This will probably be the first 
and most tangible way in which the cost of the wipe-out of capital in farmland will be 
transmitted to non-farm and urban taxpayers. 
This much can be measured. What cannot be measured is the deterioration in the quality of life in rural communities. The support base for non-governmental institutions '.'Jill be reduced as 
surely as is the tax base for schools and roads. Churches, clubs, voluntary professional 
associations, and related institutions making up the stock of rural social capital are 
threatened. It is this aspect of the process of absorbing shock by consuming capital that is 
most worrisome in its long run implications. 
One aspect of the massive shift to purchased inputs shown in Table 2 is of central importance. At the end of the Second World War those inputs requiring short-term or production 
credit involved only one-fourth of total input costs. In the 1980s, short and intermediate-term 
credit is required for one-ha 1f or more of tota 1 inputs. The farmer has become much more dependent on credit markets, and is much more exposed to interest rate fluctuations on loans that 
would normally not be based on land collateral. 
This helps explain why the collapse of land values has had so dramatic an effect on the farm financial structure. Much of the expansion in farm credit in the 1970s was triggered by the growing need for short-term credit but was secured by rising land values. Land-based credit was 
used extensively for production purposes. When the land value base collapsed, the need for production credit had to be supported by a much smaller collateral base. 
Many of the farmers currently in financial difficulty did not buy overpriced land. Instead, 
they used unrealistic land values to finance a level of input use that could not be supported by 
conventional short-term credit standards. The heavy requirement for production credit led to a burden on the land-capital base that became, in effect, another way of "living off of capital." 
This is a basic part of the explanation for the acute crisis in short-term or crop-season credit 
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that emerged in 1984 and 1985 and can be expected to grow worse in 1986. Land va 1 ues are no 
longer available as a support for production credit. 
Interpreting the probable consequences of this credit cr1s1s is confused by the extreme 
range that separates farmers with no debt from those that are bankrupt in all but a formal 
declaration. Madden has pointed out that just over half of the 2.2 million farms enumerated in 
the 1982 Census of Agriculture reported no interest expenses. The percentages ranged from a low 
of 30 percent in Iowa and North Dakota to highs of 65 percent or over in Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia (Madden, 1985, Table 2). In 
general, farms reporting no interest payments (and presumably no debt) were concentrated in the 
New England states and the South. While the burden of debt declines with size of farm, a 
surprising statistic is that almost one-fourth (23 percent) of all farms of over 2,000 acres, and 
of all farms over 500 acres, reported no interest payments in 1982 (Madden, 1985, Table 3). 
The farm debt problem is acute, but it is not universal. One of the clearest conclusions to 
emerge from Madden's study is that in all age groups of farm operators the low debt burdens were 
reported by those who 1 i sted their pri nc i pa 1 occupation as other than farming, i . e. , whose 
primary income source was from non-farm employment (Madden, 1985, Table 7). These \'Jere 45 
percent of the total of all farms. 
Two conclusions seem indicated: 
1. Small farms are not the source of the most acute financial problems. 
2. Survival in farming depends more than ever before on the availability of off-farm 
employment. 
The historic survival strategy of suppressing family living expenses (i.e., labor income) 
has been supplanted by the search for off-farm jobs. Specialization and mechanization have 
converted the majority of producers of crops into part-time farmers. Where they have little or 
no livestock, they are underemployed for a major fraction of the year. The locus of these farms 
in areas where off-farm job opportunities are rare or non-existent defines the area of the most 
acute financial crisis in contemporary U.S. agriculture. 
Economic Policies that have Hurt the Farm Sector 
Farmers have been hurt by the economic policies of the current national administration. The 
damage has ranged from moderate to severe, and there are very few plus-marks to offset the many 
minuses. Ranking the policies in terms of harm inflicted is highly subjective, and the ranking 
is not uniformly applicable to all sectors of agriculture. With this acknowledgement, it may 
still be analytically useful to suggest the following ranking for those policies that have hurt 
agriculture the most. 
1. The strong dollar 
This is, of course, a symbol rather than a causal factor, and resembles the use of a 
thermometer in measuring a patient's temperature. And yet it must be accorded a policy role of 
its own. No nation willingly accepts a devaluation of its currency. The very language used to 
describe the status of a currency -- strong or weak -- carries an implicit policy judgment. An 
exceptional level of economic understanding is required to comprehend that a weakening dollar may 
be a sign of returning vigor, and strong dollar a sign of profligate living on borrowed money. 
There is no evidence that this understanding has reached the upper 1 eve 1 s of the current 
administration. 
Until it does, farmers will face the progressive loss of foreign markets, with the prospect 
that some of them may be lost for good, As of October 1985, the projected carry-over stock of 
wheat of 47.3 million metric tons at the end of the 1985/86 marketing year will be 66 percent 
greater than projected exports for 1985/86 of 28.5 mmt. The estimated coarse grains carry-over 
of 97.8 mmt is 97 percent above expected exports of 49.7 mmt (USDA, 19858). An exchange rate for 
t~e dollar that prices U.S. grains out of foreign markets has unquestionable top ranking in any 
l1st of economic policies that harm U.S. agriculture. 
40 
2. Tax policies that have diverted investment flows into commercial, i.e., depreciable, 
real estate 
As is the case with the role of a strong dollar, the economic consequences of current tax 
policies are subtle, and difficult to identify by available measurements. The tax act of 1981 
reduced the allowable depreciation schedule for structures to 15 years. Coupled with a 
continuation of an investment tax credit of 10 percent for equipment and a lowered tax on capital 
gains, this has triggered a boom in commercial real estate and construction. This is one 
explanation for high and sustained real rates of interest. Farmers have had to bid for funds in 
credit markets in which they gained little if any of the benefits that tax policies conferred 
upon their competitors. The burden falls especially hard on proprietary firms with little or no 
income tax liability against which to offset accelerated depreciation or the interest cost of 
borrowed funds. 
It should not be surprising that the force of the current depression in agriculture is felt 
most keenly by smaller commercial farms. These are the units that are too small to generate 
income on the scale needed to benefit from current tax policies, and too large to enable the 
operator to supplement farm income with an off-farm job. 
Although it was certainly not the intent of the framers of the tax act of 1981, the policies 
are those that might have been devised to eliminate small to moderate sized, or family-type, 
farms. 
3. The deregulation of banking 
This step has been focused primarily on the financial requirements of the non-farm economy 
but its effects have been especially severe in the farm economy. With high ratios of capital to 
output, and slow turnovers, farmers must now bid for funds in national capital markets. They 
lack the market power required to pass these higher credit costs on to their customers, with the 
result that the cost must be absorbed within the farm sector. This is a major part of the 
explanation of the sharp decline in farmland values. One of the most fundamental postulates in 
economics holds that the capital value of an asset is an inverse function of the rate of 
interest. We are currently witnessing a text-book demonstration of this truth. The deregulation 
of banking alone did not cause high interest rates. But it has transferred the full force of 
this rise to the farm sector, at a time when the sector was least prepared to absorb the shock of 
a repricing of credit. 
What Can Be Said About the Future Structure of Agriculture? 
Overhanging any attempt to speculate on the answer to this question is the threat of renewed 
inflation. Those who benefitted from inflation in the 1970s, and who may wrongly see their 
salvation in another dose, comprise a formidable group. Included are bankers, farmers, forest 
land owners, "gold bugs," the energy sector, commercial real estate investors, and home owners. 
The current scale of the deficit in the federal budget, coupled with a doctrinaire unwillingness 
to raise taxes and the political difficulties in cutting expenses, make it a foolhardy exercise 
in optimism to forecast a future that includes only modest inflation. If by unlikely good 
fortune that future does emerge, some major trends of today give a basis for hesitant forecasts 
of tomorrow. 
We can begin with the ownership structure of farm real estate. One of the most durable 
trends of the past 40 years has been the relative stability of the proportions of farmland 
operated by those who rent and those who own. Since 1945, the proportion of farmland operated 
under lease varied from a low of 34.9 percent in 1954 to a high of 39.6 percent in 1978, 
declining to 38.9 percent in 1982 (DeBraal and Wunderlich, 1983, p. 49). The obverse percentage 
is that the area of farmland operated by those who own it has been remarkably stable at between 
60 and 65 percent of total farm acres since the Second World War. 
The turn-down in the percentage of land rented in 1982 is especially significant. The major 
shift in farm structure since 1945 has been the rise of "part-owner" farms. Expansion was 
achieved by renting in additional land, making part-owners the dominant tenure class in the 
United States as a whole, and in all major regions. This dominance will probably remain, but it 
may well be reduced by some retraction in farm size to accommodate more stringent financing 
capacities. In the 1930s the generalized farm depression saw a sharp rise in tenancy, reaching 
an all-time high of 45 percent of all farmland in 1935. This trend is unlikely to be repeated in 
the 1980s. Land repossessed or foreclosed will be rented out as a short-run solution, but this 
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is likely to be offset by a release of some rented land by farmers in the part-owner class. The 
most plausible scenario is for a continuation of stability in the ratio of owned to rented land, 
with some possible reduction in size of part-owner farms and thus a decline in the area of land 
rented. 
These speculations do not address the question of who will own the land. Here we enter an 
area of much greater uncertainty. It is this question that is most sensitive to expectations 
regarding inflation. If inflation can be contained within a range of 3 to 5 percent per year, 
this Qreatly reduces the attractiveness of farmland as an investment, or as an inflation hedge. 
Given the uncertainty that surrounds the prospects for foreign market expansion, a best guess for 
the remainder of the 1980s is that farmland values will do well to keep pace with the general 
level of inflation. 
If this occurs, it will throw in doubt the economic rationale for any widespread purchase of 
farmland at distressed prices by non-farm investors. Their major incentive to purchase is the 
potential for sheltering income from tax through the conversion of ordinary income into capital 
gain. If capital gain prospects are not greater than expected inflation, the opportunity cost of 
investment capital tied up in illiquid farmland is likely to discourage any rush of non-farm 
capital into farm real estate. For the near term, this seems the most probable prospect. 
Given the uneven distribution of highly indebted farms, even within local areas, and the 
documented patterns of current land market dominance by nearby farmers, the indicated answer to 
the question "Who will own the land?'' is: the neighbors. This may be no bad thing. 
The Central Issue of Excess Production 
All of the explanations for the current farm crisis, and speculations about some possible 
consequences, are dwarfed by the primary cause, which is overproduction. There has been 
widespread unwillingness to face this issue squarely. Throughout history, and for the majority 
of the world's population today, the farm problem has been one of too little food, not too much. 
Dramatic reports of food shortages, malnutrition, and famine are daily reminders of the existence 
in major populations of food needs without effective demand. In the United States, farm and 
non-farm people alike have misinterpreted this need as evidence of potential export markets. 
This misinterpretation is reinforced by the entire agricultural information system. 
Increasing output has been an almost universal goal of agricultural universities, experiment 
stations, and extension activities serving agriculture in the public sector. This is even more 
characteristic of private firms and information services supplying inputs or information to 
agriculture, or marketing its products. Agribusiness interests benefit directly from a high 
volume of farm output, and avoid or oppose any discussion of production controls. 
The strangled nature of public discussion of alternative ways to reduce farm output has 
encountered even greater political opposition during the current crisis. This has been due to 
doctrinal and ideological positions taken by the present administration of the federal 
government. The evaporation of hopes of salvation through expanded foreign markets occurred at 
the peak of a rejection of any programs involving greater governmental participation in 
production controls. Given the number, distribution, and relatively small scale of U.S. farms, 
no power short of governmental action or brutal price declines could hope to bring down output on 
the scale needed. This administration has opted for price declines, although its conviction is 
wavering. 
The prospect for the next three years is for delay, a death-bed conversion, and 
election-bred efforts at the last minute to introduce dramatic programs to reduce output. The 
ill-conceived and disastrously expensive PIK program of 1983-84 is unfortunately the only model 
on which to base a forecast of probable political responses to the present crisis. 
The prospect is further confused by a persistent failure to distinguish between the problem 
of too many farmers, and the problem of too much land and capital committed to production. For 
at least 40 years the problem of increasing farmers' income has been viewed simplistically as a 
problem of too many farmers. The solution has been personalized by focusing on the withdrawal of 
labor and the elimination of farm firms. 
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It is arguable that the withdrawal of labor has gone far enough. Excessive labor costs are 
not propelling the present crisis, and it will not be resolved by eliminating farmers. The more 
critical question is what will be done with the land. Wiping out farm firms will leave unto•1ched 
the problem of too much land in production, and may even make it worse. The fann firms being 
eliminated in the 1980s are not concentrated at the margins of cultivation, nor are they grouped 
at the bottom end of the scale of farm sizes. Their land will remain in production, in any 
scenario that rests on output control by commodity price declines. 
The conclusion seems unavoidable that some program of land use control must be embedded in 
any prescription for the solution to the farm problem of the 1980s. The debate, when focused, is 
between a system that achieves restrictions on production by creating private firms or groups of 
firms large enough to internalize the cost of control, and a system that attempts control through 
some combination of regulations on land use and marketing that involve a substantial element of 
public authority. 
Either alternative involves elements that are distasteful, and uncertainty that cannot be 
reduced to calculable risk. The broad issue is clear enough. Do we want production control in 
agriculture to be achieved by firms big enough to pass on the cost of control through the price 
sys tern in the form of higher food prices? Or is the pub 1 i c interest best served by contro 1 s 
achieved by the selective use of tax revenues to bring about an orderly withdrawal of productive 
resources from agriculture, while maintaining reserve capacity that can serve as insurance 
against unexpected shocks? Do we want the cost distributed through the system of food prices, or 
through the tax system? 
The farm crisis of the 1980s differs from previous crises in many ways. One of the most 
significant is that it is not most acute in areas where farm sizes are too small to be economic. 
The structure of U.S. agriculture is basically sound, but it is seriously threatened. The origin 
of this threat lies largely outside the agricultural sector. It originated in macroeconomic 
policies that generated inflation and unrealistic expectations in the 1970s, and dashed these 
expectations by a preference for interest-rate instead of tax policy to control inflation in the 
1980s. 
These policies raised credit costs, choked back exports, and precipitated a deflation in the 
agricultural sector that ranks with a scale of destruction of capital values that other nations 
have only experienced in time of war. It can in truth be regarded as a delayed response to the 
inflation that was guaranteed by the decision in the 1960s to engage in the Viet Nam war without 
raising taxes to hold back demand. Agriculture, heavy industry, and the export sector are now 
paying the cost of that mistaken decision. 
The mistake was nationwide. It does not seem unreasonable to argue that the cost of 
repairing that mistake should also be assumed at the national level. The argument should not be 
couched in terms of the merits of further subsidies to a class of producers believed or not 
believed to be deserving. Instead, it should rest on the value to the nation of maintaining a 
stock of human and physical capital in an agriculture that has served it well. 
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U.S. AGRICULTURE: ASSESSMENTS FOR 1985 
Abner W. Womack 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, UMC 
Introduction 
As the U.S. Congress tried to hammer out a 1985 farm bill, considerable disagreement 
prevailed as to the optimum degree of government involvement in U.S. agriculture. Many 
hard-pressed farmers and some farm organizations asked for higher internal prices with mandatory 
controls, to insure prices above cost of production. At the same time a large segment of U.S. 
farmers and several farm organizations wanted less government with a market oriented agriculture. 
Search for the appropriate mix of these objectives, costs, and benefits set the agenda for public 
debate in the closing months of 1985. 
Debate on that topic calls for evaluation of farm program options. Recent economic analyses 
conducted by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri and 
Iowa State University indicate, for example, that none of three options--continuation of current 
government programs, or passage of policies that emphasize expanded exports on the one 1hand, or 
free warkets on the other, will significantly bolster the agricultural economy. These 
conclusions are based on several features of the 1985 agricultural environment. 
Significant Factors Affecting U.S. Agriculture 
Highlight of FAPRI analysis of alternative farm programs is that the most significant issues 
impacting U.S. agriculture in the later 1980s will be forces external to administration of farm 
programs. These include: 
1. The level of growth in both domestic and foreign economies. Slow economic growth along with 
a highly valued dollar and high interest rates would keep U.S. agriculture in financial 
stringency. Additionally, per capita consumption of red meat continues to decline, placing 
U.S. livestock producers under continued financial pressure and shrinking the total livestock 
inventory. Total red meat consumption has declined from a high of 191 pounds per capita in 
1971 to a current level of approximately 170 pounds per capita (Figure 1). Although the 
consumption rate fluctuates, its longer trend is downward. The slippage appears to be 
divided about equally between beef and pork. 
2. Supply capacity at current market prices is approximately 30-35 million acres of production 
area in excess of what is required to meet current domestic and foreign demands. To maintain 
current loan and target prices would require strong acreage control programs that could cost 
$7-8 billion for the crop portion alone. Dairy and other programs could increase the budget 
exposure to more than $10-12 billion per year. Compounding this total supply problem is the 
large size of 1985 crop harvests, which are near or above long term trends. Continued 
accumulation of stocks and relatively low prices for farm crop commodities are in prospect 
(Figures 2 and 3). Sluggish domestic and foreign demand for 1985 crops points to an increase 
in stocks of grains and soybeans. Stocks at the end of the 1985-86 marketing season will be 
substantially in excess of longer run average carryover levels (Figure 4). In fact, the 
excess carryover in sight for major commodities is equivalent to approximately 24-25 million 
acres of crop land. The 30-35 million acres of total excess current production capacity plus 
the additional 25 million acres reflected in the projected carryover make clear that U.S. 
agriculture will continue to have difficulty achieving a balance with projected demand. 
3. U.S. trade shares in export markets are being continually chiseled away by foreign 
competitors. The United States can improve its market share gradually over time by moving 
more toward a free market, but the loss in farm income may be too great, in the current 
environment. An immediate reduction in loan rate or support price to farmers plus reductions 
in other support payments could leave agriculture with $8-10 billion less in net farm income 
than under current farm programs. 
1FAPRI staff Report #1-85, "Options for the 1985 Farm Bill: An Analysis and Evaluation," S.R. 
Johnson, Abner l~. Womack, William H. Meyers, Robert E. Young II, c.nd Jon Brandt, January 1985; 
FAPRI Staff Report #5-85, "Preliminary Results on a Variable Loan Repayment Option for the 1985 
Farm bill," S.R. Johnson, Robert E. Young II, William H. Meyers, and Abner W. Womack, April 1985. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 3 
YIELD OF WHEAT AND SOYBEANS PER HARVESTED ACRE, AND TREND VALUES 
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Figure 4 
ENDING STOCKS OF U. S. CORN, WHEAT, AND SOYBEANS 
Billion bushels 
3.0 
2.5 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
19 3 
46 
1\ 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ / \ 
I \ 
I \ 
,.., / \ 
,." ' I 
.,.. ' I 
',t 
1 
Several factors are associated with the decline in U.S. agricultural exports shown in Figure 5. Taken together, they indicate that it will be hard to arrest the current downward trend. The most significant is weakness in foreign demand, both in the developed and developing 
regions of the world. Developed regions have experienced recessions and developing regions have significant financial problems that will require a number of years to correct. Also, a highly valued dollar relative to the currency of countries with which we trade continues to put U.S. commodities at an economic disadvantage in world competition. 
Production in both domestic and exporting regions of the world is projected to grow faster 
than demand. U.S. loan or support rates, setting a floor under world market prices, have 
contributed to foreign competitors' expansion in output of major exportable commodities. 
Subsidization of exports by major competitors in the world market aggravates the oversupplied 
world market situation. There is even a potential for a trade war. 
In view of all these complicating factors, it is by no means clear that an immediate shift to 
a lower price policy by the United States would quickly stimulate export demand to the extent 
that net farm income could be sustained at current levels. 
Figure 5 
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4. The farm financial crisis is another negative feature of U.S agriculture today. Potential levels of unserviced debt exceed those of any period since the depression of the 1930s. A 1 a rge number of farmers have been trapped by a turnaround in environment from one of incentives for expansion to the current dowrward spiral of asset values. Even many farmers 
who expanded only moderately during the mid to late 1970s now find themselves with debt/asset 
ratios that cannot be managed. Financial problems are common to all areas of U.S. 
agriculture. However, surveys conducted by several states tend to indicate that the most 
serious problems occur in the Corn Belt or, generally, the central rEqion of the country. Incentives for expansion to meet anticipated strong export demand apparently resulted in more investment in land and equipment in that area. High interest rates and lo~<t commodity prices bring severe cash flow problems to many producers. Data in the table below report debt/asset 
ratios by age groups and regions of the United states in 1985. A vulnerable zone for cash flow or financial problems is a debt ratio of 40 percent or greater. A 40 percent debt/asset 
ratio implies $40 of debt for each $100 of assets. Data in the table indicate that the 
national average debt/asset ratio is about 32 percent with an average of 51 percent in the 
age group below 35. The central region of the United states contains heavy debt/asset ratios 
through age 54 with an average for the central region of 38.2 percent. 
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Farmer5' Debt/Asset Ratio by Region and Age Group 
Age 
Region Under 35 35-44 45-54 55-64 Over 65 All Ages 
percent 
Central 55.100 56.830 44.128 18.618 8.130 38.J91 
~Jest 44.613 42.112 25.808 19.028 11.060 27.798 
South 44.725 40.196 23.495 16.933 5.537 25.576 
East 41.519 26.846 17.739 11.186 5.683 20.062 
Weighted U.S. 
average 
50.650 47.367 32.598 17.754 7.243 31.652 
"The National Farm Survey on Fi nancial Stress," FAPRI Staff Report #6-85 , July 1985. Survey 
conducted by Farm Journal and the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute. 
5. More responsible management of the currePt budget deficit could have a dual impact on the 
U.S. agricultural sector. On the positive side, reduction of the deficit, with its 
corollaries of lower interest rates and a lower valued dollar, would ease financial stress of 
farmers and strengthen our ability to compete on world markets for U.S . agriculture. 
However, if budget action were primarily the curbing of government spending, U.S. agriculture 
could be a net loser in the near term. Any programs of acreage reduction and farm financial 
assistance intended to defend the current structure of U.S. agriculture would involve 
government expenditures greater than the normal allocation to agricultural programs. 
Implications for the 1985 Farm Bi 11 
In general the Reagan Administration and major farm organizations are in agreement that the 
current farm program is not working satisfactorily. Program costs are substantially in excess of 
those normally experienced, yet 30 percent of U.S. farmers are in serious financial trouble. What 
program design would best address the problem, in the interest of both agriculture and the 
consumer? Currently the jury is still out. Voluntary programs that offer farmers incentives to 
reduce production have been favored over other designs for the past 30 years. No alternative farm 
program has yet left the drawing board that (1) retains the flexibility of voluntary 
participation; (2) circumvents the problems associated with stagnant demand, excess capacity, 
declining exports, financial pressures, and budget constraints; and (3) maintains at least current 
levels of net farm income. Clearly, a major difficulty in the development of a new farm bill is 
that all these considerations amount to a load heavier than has ever been carried by a farm bill. 
They exceed the range of most policy-making and program-administration . 
Additional dialogue and debate on the 1985 farm bill (as of mid-November) was likely to focus 
on the following questions. First, should support for the farm financial crisis be maintained 
inside the farm bill or carried as a separate financial package? Second, does financial 
assistance require the development of a new farm credit organization, or support for the financial 
institutions now in place? Third, can formulas be developed for programs of interest buy-down and 
debt restructuring that are fair and equitable? Fourth, can a program of financial support be 
accomplished at a cost that is within the range of harm (cost) to the general economy (the 
spillover effect) that would be felt if nothing were done? 
48 
Summary 
U.S. agriculture is at a crossroads. Program designs aimed at moving it into a more 
competitive environment in world trade could have serious immediate consequences for net farm 
income. The consequences could be severe, in the light of the high percentage of farmers in 
financial difficulty. Excess capacity compounded by very favorable crop conditions in 1985 make 
it harder to hold farm program costs within the budget guidelines set by Congress. 
With regard to reducing the deficit in the federal budget, agriculture is trapped in a 
difficult spot. It would gain by a stronger demand, lower interest rates, and lower valued 
dollar . However, to whatever extent the budget action reduced spending for farm programs, a very 
serious farm financial problem would simply be compounded. 
The jury was still out, as of mid-November, on the direction that Congress will take in 
hammering out a farm bill for 1985. But if the bill were to deal with all the problems and 
objectives that have been named here, ma j or modifications in the existing program design would be 
necessary. 
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FARM FINANCIAL SITUATION: 
ITS CAUSE, AND A LOOK AT PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
J. Bruce Bullock, Chairman 
Department of Agricultural Economics, UMC 
There is widespread financial stress in the agricultural sector, in spitP. of the 
Administration's insistence to the contrary. Many farms have already passed the point of no 
return as ar economically viable business unless Santa Claus puts a sizable roll of $1,000 bills 
in their Christmas stocking. The same can be said for many agricultural banks and for the Farm 
Credit System. 
U.S. farm debt is about $215 billion. Based on USDA survey data reflecting the cash 
shortfall of farmers under financial stress, I estimate that $50 billion of that debt cannot be 
repaid from the combined farm and non-farm income of the farm families who owe th~ debt. 
To put it mildly, the agricultural finance situation is in a mess. Unfortunately, there are 
no simple or painless methods of correcting the situation. 
My remarks focus on two questions: First, how did we get ourselves into a situation where 20 
percent of agricultural debt cannot be repaid? 
Second, how successful will alternative public policies be in dealing with this problem? 
How Did We Get Here? 
The current financial problems in U.S. agriculture were created because over the decade of 
the 1970s farm debt expanded annually by the amount of increases in asset values !'ather than at 
the rate dictated by growth in repayment capacity (farm income). Over the decade of the 1970s, 
the value of farm assets increased 220 percent; farm debt increased 2?8 percent. Consequently, 
the debt-to-asset ratio only increased from 16.8 to 17.3 percent and agricultural lenders felt 
quite comfortable with their collateral position. However, while farm debt increased 228 percent 
over the decade of the 1970s, net farm income (repayment capacity) increased only 52 percent. 
There is no mystery about why a substantial number of farmers can't make loan payments. The 
expansion of debt during the 1970s simply got out of line with the repayment capacity of farm 
income. Farm debt per dollar of net farm income increased from an average of $3.41 in 1970-72 to 
$7.37 in 1980-82. Preliminary estimates for 1985 show $9.87 of farm debt for every dollar of net 
farm income. Throughout the 1970s the tripling of farm debt was justified on the basis of a 
tripling of asset values generated by the inflation euphoria of that period. Unfortunately, 
repayment capacity never existed for a large part of the agricultural debt expansion . This debt 
was borrowed at double digit interest rates to finance investments that were earning less than a 5 
percent rate of return. 
Lending money against inflated values of assets that have i nadequate earning capacity for 
debt repayment makes sense only if inflation continues forever, or if the assets are sold at their 
inflated value prior to termination of inflation. Obviously, neither of these developments 
occurred. Inflation was brought under control, causing the inevitable decline in land values. 
Land values established in 1981 made sense only if inflation continued at levels anticipated in 
1981. Land values in the 11 midwestern states have declined from 20 to 49 percent since 1981. 
The decline in 1 and va 1 ues has had the obvious impact of consuming the farmers' equity and 
hence their lenders' margin of collateral. The debt asset ratio for aariculture has risen from 
0.16 in 1981 to 0.21 in 1984 and will be even higher for 1985. -
The sharp decline in agricultural land values is often cited as the cause of the agricultural 
finance problems. However, the decline in land values is not the cause of financial problems of 
farmers. The decline in land values has had no impact on the debt repayment capacity of the 
1sullock, J. Bruce. "Farm Credit Situation: Implications for Agricultural Policy," FAPRI #4-85, 
University of Missouri-Columbia, March 1985. 
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agricultural sector. Declining land values have simply removed the artificial impression of financial well-being that both farmers and their lenders had been operating under for the past 10 years. Without the umbrella of inflation-driven increases in land values to collater~lize 
expanded debt to cover cash flow shortages, the agri cu ltura 1 sector is faced with the rising delinquency rates on farm loans and increasing numbers of loan foreclosures and farm bankruptcies. 
Expanding debt beyond repayment capacity is the basic cause of the farm finance problem. 
However, the sharp decline in land prices has caused the farm finance problem to spill over into 
the laps of agricultural lenders. Since land acquired via foreclosures cannot be sold at the loan book value, the farm business failures are increasingly being translated into bank failures. 
The observed increase in farm loan delinquencies has occurred simultaneousJy with record levels of real interest rates and substantial increases in the valu~? of the U.S. dollar. Thus, government economic policies designed to bring inflation under control have been blamed for most 
of the financial problems in agriculture. High interest rates and the strong value of the dollar 
tend to compound the pressures created by the excess farm debt situation. However, high interest 
rates and weak export demand are not the cause of the financial problems in agriculture. 
Some observers cite the fact that interest expenses have increased from 7.5 percent of total farm production expenses during lg70-72 to 15 percent in 1981-83 as evidence that high interest 
rates are the cause of the current problems. Total interest payments on agricultural debt in 1981-83 were 5.85 times their level in 1970-71 ($21,096 vs. $3,604). However, this increase 
resu 1 ted from a 260 percent increase in farm debt and on 1 y a 60 percent increase in interest 
rates. Over half, 53 percent, of the increase in interest payments is due to expanded debt. Furthermore, interest rates are down 24 percent since 1981, while farm debt is 18 percent higher. 
This has been a rather long winded response to the question of how we got ourselves into a 
situation where 20 percent of farm debt cannot be repaid. The problem was created because lenders based lending decisions on debt/asset ratios rather than on debt repayment capacity. Land values 
were increasing much more rapidly than farm income. Thus, throughout the latter half of the 1970s 
collateral lending practices were converting non-income-generating increases in land values into 
cash via interest-bearing debt. The decline in land values since 1981 has evaporated the inflated 
value of the collateral but has not erased the interest-bearing debt. The cash had been spent on investments that generated returns below the interest rate at which the funds had been borrowed. There is no way to avoid the inevitable losses and wealth redistribution between borrowers and lenders. The difficult question facing policy makers is how these losses are to be distributed 
among farmers, agricultural lenders, and taxpayers. Unfortunately, most of the proposals for dealing with the financial problem of agriculture focus on treating the symptom of the problem 
rather than correcting the cause of the problem. 
Policy Options and Their Potential Effectiveness 
Debt Moratoria 
Debt moratorium proposals basically treat the financial problem as being a temporary 
shortfall in income. However, net farm income has not changed much over the past five years. Also, there is no reason to expect farm income to increase sharply over the next three to five years. Thus, proposals for debt morat0ria are based on an unrealistic view of the economic 
realities of the agricultural sector. 
Most moratorium proposals do not explicitly state who is to absorb the cost of the 
moratorium. Indeed, most proposals do not seem to recognize that there are costs associated with 
a debt moratorium. One option is to have the borrower pay the cost by amortizing the unpaid principal and accrued interest into his debt. This solution expands the borrower's debt and makes 
no sense if the problem is already too much debt. The second option is to have the lender absorb 
the cost of the debt moratorium. This seems to be the optior: implied by most debt moratorium proposals. However, this option simply passes a large part of the cost of the moratorium on to 
other borrowers in the form of hioher interest rates or to stockholders of the lending agency in 
the form of lower returns-- possibly even bankrupting the lender. Thus, debt moratoria either 
compound the problem or spread the cost of the moratorium to third parties. Neither option helps 
solve the basic problem. 
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Interest Rate Buydowns 
This approach focuses on a symptom of the excess debt problem rather than on solving the 
problem. As noted earlier, interest rates are about 60 percent higher now than during the early 
1970s. But more importantly, farm debt is over three times what it was in 1970. Higher interest 
rates account for less than half of the increasPd interest payments on the farm debt over the past 
10 years. Farmers in financial troubles would have almost as many problems servicing their debt 
at earlier interest rates as at current ones. 
Not every farm in financial trouble can be given effective temporary relief from its excess 
debt problem. Forty-five percent of the excess debt is held by farms with less than $50,000 
annual gross sales. This group also accounts for 54 percent of the farms with serious financial 
problems. We would have to forgive over 125 percent of the debt held by these farms in order to 
correct their financial problems. Thus, even interest rate buydowns that provided zero interest 
rates would not solve the financial problems of these farms. 
Suppose we targeted an interest rate buydown program to those that could benefit. A 60 
percent buydown of interest rates only for those farms with excess debt that could be converted to 
a positive cash flow would help about 52 percent of the financially stressed farms grossing more 
than $50,000 annually (25 percent of all financially stressed farms). The program would cost 
approximately $2.0 billion annually -- roughly $21,000 per farm assisted. 
If policy makers are interested in providing limited and temporary relief to symptoms of the 
excess debt problem rather than correcting the problem, then partial payment of interest bills 
(i.e., interest rate buydowns) probably provides more bang-for-the-buck than other alternatives. 
However, since this approach only relieves pressures of symptoms, it will have to be repeated for 
an indefinite period until the cause of the problem is corrected. 
Higher Price Supports 
Many farmers and other observers seem to think that higher farm commodity prices will cure 
any problem facing agriculture. However, analysis of USDA data shows that these observers are 
kidding themse 1 ves about the capacity of higher support prices to so 1 ve the current fi nanci a 1 
problems in agriculture. Farm prices would have to be increased from 15 to 560 percent to correct 
the financial problems for most of the farms with severe financial stress. 
It is neither practical nor possible to generate price increases of this magnitude by price 
support programs. The current financial problems of U.S. agriculture are too large to be solved 
by price and income support programs. 
Provide Government Loan Guarantees 
Policy makers should keep one thing in mind as they consider this policy option for dealing 
with an excess debt problem. Government loan guarantees do not increase the repayment capacity of 
farmers with financial stress. A loan guarantee pr0gram will successfully deal with the financial 
stress problem only if the program requires that the excess debt situation of the borrower be 
corrected (e.g., sufficient debt is written off) as a precondition for obtaining the loan 
guarantee. Failure to impose such a requirement would simply mean that the unavoidable wealth 
losses required to correct the excess debt problem will be transferred from borrowers and lenders 
to the government. This is certainly a viable policy option. However, it should be recognized up 
front as a loss transfer mechanism. 
Expand Government Loan Programs 
~1ore credit, even at subsidized interest rates, is not the solution to an excess debt 
problem. An expanded government loan program is the worst possible policy that could be pursued. 
Providing additional debt to these farmers is analogous to putting more water in the swimming pool 
in an attempt to save a person observed to be drowning in water over his head. 
A strong case can be made that liberal lending policies promulgated by Congress through FmHA 
has already compounded rather than eased the farm credit problem. Government lending programs 
have provided 20 percent of the growth in non-real estate debt over the past 12 years. FmHA 
provided 34 percent of the increase in farm non-real estate debt during the 1979-82 period. FmHA 
market share of non-real estate debt increased from 5 percent in 1973 to 15 percent in 1983. 
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A good portion of this debt was for disaster relief. Disaster loans simply add to the 
disaster of farms that already have more debt than can be repaid. Borrowed funds can profitably 
be used only on investments that yield a return higher than the interest rate at which the funds 
were borrowed. Payment of last year's production expenses from funds borrowed in lieu of a failed 
crop produce zero return on investment. 
The ineffectiveness of the disaster loan program for providing disaster relief is evident 
from delinquency rates on disaster loans. Thirty-nine percent of FmHA disaster loans were 
delinquent as of June 30, 1985. Of these delinquent loans, 91 percent have been delinquent for 
more than a year and 70 percent are at least three years past due. 
There is perhaps a genuine need for farm programs to provide mechanisms for disaster relief. 
However, this disaster relief must take the form of indemnity payments from insurance to avoid 
doing more harm than good in providing farmers with money to deal with disaster. 
Add Liquidity to the Land Market 
One proposal is an agency to purchase land. This approach was being proposed for a while by 
the Farm Credit System under the title of the Agricultural Conservation Corporation. The agency 
would give strength and liquidity to the land market by purchasing land and then leasing it back 
to the farmer so that the farming operation could be continued. If the land purchase agency 
expected to receive a competitive return on funds invested in land purchases and if land were pur-
chased at a price equal to the selling farmer's debt, the lease payments would be about the same 
as the interest payments the farmer had been making on the land debt. The borrower's title would 
be traded for release from making principal payments. 
The operations of such a land purchase/lease back agency would completely solve the cash 
shortfall problems only for about 20 percent of the highly leveraged farms. The remaining farms 
would still have several thousand dollars in annual cash shortfalls. 
The land purchase proposal does deal directly with the problem of excess debt. It removes 
the burden of principal payments from the farmer, but does not remove interest payment 
obligations. 
Remove Excess Debt 
Solution to the excess debt problem requires that the excess debt and associated principal 
and interest payments be removed from the agricultural balance sheet and cash flow. The facts of 
life are that someone is going to have to eat the excess debt. The only question is who will eat 
it. 
The Federal Government will be heavily involved regardless of the policy option selected. 
The government holds about $27 billion of the excess farm debt in the form of FmHA loans. Since 
FmHA is by law the lender of last resort, a very high proportion of its portfolio is almost 
certainly in the "impossible to repay" category. Thus, one step of the adjustment process might 
be to terminate all FmHA agricultural lending operations and forgive all outstanding FmHA farm 
loans. This would eliminate about one-half of the excess debt. 
Do Nothing 
One policy option is simply to let the chips fall where they may. This would mean that the 
losses will be shared between borrowers and lenders. A do nothing government program would result 
in a substantial transfer of asset ownership from borrowers to lenders and/or a substantial 
increase in the amount of land sales. Land prices have already fallen 20 to 49 percent in the 
Corn Belt. Forcing the complete adjustment to occur through land sales would generate additional 
declines in land values--something that may occur regardless of the policy selected. However, a 
do nothing policy is likely to cause an overreaction in land prices in the short run. 
A do nothing policy is workable. The market will adjust. The results will include a 
substantial increase in the number of loan foreclosures and farm bankruptcies. It will also 
result in a substantial increase in the number of agricultural bank failures including the Farm 
Credit System. A viable agriculture and viable lending institutions would emerge after a do 
nothing policy. 
The policy would bring major structural changes in agriculture and among the lenders. The 
impacts of these changes would spill over into main street of rural communities. Policy makers 
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wi 11 have to decide if these changes are an acceptab 1 e price to pay for getting rid of excess 
debt. From an economic efficiency standpoint, a do nothing pol icy is the preferred solution. 
However, the social consequences of a do nothing policy are quite likely to be unacceptable to 
both the public and to policy makers. However, policy makers have been quite reluctant to 
acknowledge that there is a financial problem. Thus, we may have a do nothing policy by default. 
Conclusions 
The magnitude of the excess farm debt problem requires large scale and immediate corrections. 
Failure to correct the problem will completely consume the remaining equity of farmers holding the 
excess debt. Failure to correct the problem will also threaten the economic viability of 
financial institutions currently providing credit to agricultural producers. 
There is no way of avoiding the wealth transfers and losses resulting from creation of the 
excess debt and the asset devaluations that followed. Failure to recoonize the losses and to 
terminate the growing debt service ob 1 i gat ions associ a ted with the excess debt compounds the 
problem. 
The challenge facing policy makers is to determine how those losses are to be distributed 
among borrowers, lenders, and taxpayers. 
High interest rates are not the cause of the farm finance problem. The excess debt problem 
is so large that interest rate subsidies will provide only partial relief to the symptoms of the 
problem. 
The nature and magnitude of the farm finance problem renders price support policies 
ineffective as a solution. The farm finance problem must be dealt with separately from price and 
income policies. Moreover, it should have been dealt with before the 1985 farm bill was 
developed. Since Congress chose not to do this, it was impossible to obtain significant changes 
in the farm program. 
One thing is clear. A policy decision should be made quickly. If there is to be relief 
through government programs, it should be implemented as soon as possible to terminate the losses 
and the disruption caused by the current situation. If the decision is to do nothing, then 
lenders and borrowers need to know that so they can immediately initiate the adjustments required 
to minimize losses. 
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EMERGING TRADE POLICY ISSUES: THE HARD CHOICES 
William H. Meyers 
Professor of Economics, Iowa State University 
Agricultural trade pol icy has been receiving increased attention in the United States the 
last few years. The reason is obvious. After a decade during which the value of agricultural 
exports grew from $8 billion annually to a peak of nearly $44 billion in 1981, both quantities 
and values of exports have fallen substantially. USDA estimates put farm exports in 1985 at $32 
billion. 
In the long history of U.S. agriculture, exports have often been a major force in 
agricultural prosperity and distress. It is a natural tendency, therefore, to look at export 
growth as a solution to the dismal state of the farm economy. Unfortunately, .poor export 
performance is on 1 y one of a comp 1 ex array of factors that have contributed to the current 
distress in agriculture; and many of these factors are jointly related to macroeconomic policies 
and performance. 
The major elements of these changes from the 1970s to the 1980s are noted in Table 1. The 
economic policies that successfully wrung inflation out of the U.S. economy also slowed economic 
Table 1. Economic Environment Affecting Agriculture, United States, 1970s and 1980s 
Item Unit 1970s 1980s 
Period Data Period Data 
Inflation rate Range in decade 5 to 10 decade 3 to 5 
annual percent 
Real interest rate Range in decade -1 to 3 decade 5 to 9 
annual percent 
Budget deficit Range, annual, decade -10 to -70 decade -60 to -180 
billion dollars 
Current account Range, annual, decade +20 to -20 decade +5 to -120 
balance billion dollars 
Exchange rate of Percent change 1969-80 -29 1980-84 +50 
dollar over period 
Net debt transfer Annual average, 1978-81 +30 1982-83 -2 
to developing bi 11 ion dollars 
countries 
Value of exports Change over 1971-81 +35.8 1981-85 -] 1.8 
of farm products period, billion 
dollars 
Cost of agricultural Annual average, 1971-81 5 1982-85 14 
programs billion dollars 
growth here and in many foreign countries. U.S. inflation rates fell more rapidly than interest 
rates, caus i no rea 1 rates of interest to rise. The 1981 tax cut reduced government revenues 
without an asiociated cutback in qovernment expenditures, causing the federal budget deficit to 
increase rapidly and put further up~1ard pressure on real rates of interest. As foreign 
investors bought dollars to invest here and earn these high returns, the dollar appreciated and 
made our exports more costly abroad. The decline in exports relative to imports created a 
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substantial increase in the current account deficit. The world economic slowdown in the early 
1980s, combined with high real interest rates and an appreciating dollar, contributed to debt 
crises in many Third World economies. Public and private debt disbursements to developing 
countries declined and debt repayments increased until the net debt transfers became negative. 
All of these factors contributed to a substantial decline in U.S. agricultural exports from 
the peak in 1981. Added to this weak demand, the bumper crops in the United states in 1981 and 
1982 set the stage for a substantial decline in farm prices, incomes, and land values. Commodity 
programs designed to provide a measure of protection to farm prices and income absorbed 
substantial amounts of the growing surplus through building stocks, and acreage reductions 
followed. Program costs rose to nearly three times the rate of expenditures incurred during the 
1970s. 
The reversal of conditions that existed before the turn of the decade could hardly be more 
complete. Exchange rate changes and export declines can be viewed as casualties rather than 
causes of this turnaround. It is clear that macroeconomic policies have been a major element in 
this reversal. The large negative impacts of the changed macroeconomic policiPs on agriculture 
\'Jere not anticipated. In fact, some earlier studies by Tweeten suggested that expansionary 
monetary policies were harmful to agriculture. More recent studies by Starleaf, Meyers, and 
Womack (1985) and Devadoss, Meyers, and Starleaf (1985) have provided evidence that farmers are 
adversely affected by the kind of stringent monetary policies that were initiated in 1979 and 
carried into the 1980s. 
Before proceeding to discuss trade pol icy issues that have emerged from this wrenching 
experience, we need to look more carefully at the patterns of growth and decline in trade that 
have been experienced. A better understanding of the factors underlying these changes will make 
it possible to form better judgments about the trade policy issues and options that are emerging. 
Sources of Growth and Decline in Exports 
For analytical purposes, it is important to separate two components of change in U.S. 
exports. The first is the total world iMports of the commodity, and the second is the U.S. share 
of those imports. Separation of these two elements helps to distinguish the factors that 
influence each and to determine the prospects for influencing these factors. Figure 1 shows the 
pattern of growth and decline in total grain trade for the world and the United States, and the 
U.S share. World imports of these commodities nearly doubled from 1970 to 1980. The U.S. 
production machine was able to respond quickly to the fast gro\'rt:h in demand and increased its 
share of world grain trade from 34 percent in 1970 to a peak of 52 percent in 1979. Much land 
that had been idled by government programs in the 1960s was brought back into production, 
cropland irrigation was expanded, and productivity increased. As a result, U.S. agriculture took 
advantage of the situation but in doing so became more dependent or. export demand, which is far 
less stable and predictable than U.S. domestic demand. 
In the 1980s total world grain trade has exhibited slight variations from year to year but 
no growth. U.S. exports, however, declined and were replaced by exports from competitors 
including the European Community. During this period, the U.S. export share dropped to 40 
percent in 1984, and is estimated at around 38 percent in 1985. Even if the U.S. trade share had 
been maintained at 50 percent, U.S. exports in the 1980s would not have experienced any growth. 
Because of the relatively large U.S. share in world grain trade, it has been too easy to 
think that the world is heavily dependent on us for grain supplies. That is true in the short run, 
but it is important to remember that even though our exports now represent about 40 percent of 
world trade in grains, they only represent about 6 percent of world production of these 
commodities. It is clear that in the 1980s the. United sTates is more dependent on the world 
rnarket as a source of demand growth, but the world market is not as dependent on the United 
States as a source of supply. 
Factors Influencing World Imports 
The major factors affecting demand for grain in importing countries are the rate of growth 
in income and population on the demand side, and the rate of production growth in those 
countries. Population marches along at a fairly predictable rate, but economic growth and 
indigenous production are much more variable and subject to policy influences. The net importing 
areas of the world for wheat and coarse grains are divided into nine regions in Figures 2 and 3. 
In the 1970s a 11 of these regions contributed to some degree to the growth in import del'land, but 
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in the 1980s China, East Europe, and West Europe (excluding the European Community) had sharp detlines in import demand. 
The most rapid import growth in the 1970s came from these last-named regions plus the USSR 
and the Upper-Middle Income (UMINC) Developing Countries. Throughout the entire period Japan, the Lower-Middle Income (LMINC) Developing Countries, and the High Income (HINC) Developing Countries show steady rates of growth. The low income (LINC) developing countries increased imports rapidly from 1971 to 1974 but then reduced their buying sharply in the following three years and remained fairly flat markets afterward. 
Two of the three regions where imports fell sharply in the 1980s, East Europe and Other West Europe (excluding the EC), had large increases in production while utilization was fairly 
constant. In China, utilization increased but production increased much more rapidly, making import substitution possible. While slowing of demand growth is evident in other regions, it 
appears that a major factor contributing to the stagnant import growth in the 1980s is the sharp increase in production experienced in Europe and China. 
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Factors Affecting Trade Shares 
Loss in trade share by the United States, when the world total is steady, is matched by 
equivalent gains by competitors. Our loss could be associated with the appreciation of the dollar, the price levels supported by our loan rates, or policies of competing exporters that induce larger production and/or subsidize their exports. For a number of years the United States and its competitors, inc 1 ud i ng the EC, increased their grain exports at about the same rate. About 1980 U.S. exports began to decline, while competitor exports continued to grow. A very similar pattern is evident in Figure 4 for soybeans and the soybean equivalent of meal. Note that the turnaround in U.S. exports is coincident with the appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies. The higher value of the dollar provides competitors with greater opportunity to sell competitively in international markets. 
Figure 4 
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T~ble 2 summarizes the major factors affecting total exports and trade shares that have been emphas1zed as having important effects on U.S. agricultural exports in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the 1970s, the positive factors overpowered the relatively less important negative factors and genera ted rapid export expansion. In the first half of the 1980s a 11 of these factors have turned negative. 
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Table 2. Trade Impact of Factors Influencing World Grain Demand and U.S. Trade Share over Three 
Time Periods 
Factor 
Affecting world imports 
Importer ' s production 
Importer's income growth 
Net debt transfer 
Affecting U.S. Trade Sharf! 
u.s. dollar value 
u.s. agricultural policy 
Competitors' agricultural policies 
1970s 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Negative 
1980-85 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
1985-90 
? 
? 
Negative 
Positive 
? 
? 
Looking ahead to the 1 ast ha 1 f of the 1980s, there appears to be one ray of hope so far. 
The dollar has been depreciating in value for much of 1985 and it is expected to decline further 
in the years just ahead. On the other hand, the debt problems of the developing countries are 
unlikely to improve. They could even get worse before they get better. 
Other factors are more uncertain. Our FAPRI (1985) projections based on the macroeconomic 
forecasts of Wharton Econometrics, and assuming a movement toward market oriented loan rates in 
the United States, do not provide a very bright outlook. Even with substantial declines in the 
value of the dollar and continued low commodity prices, U.S. exports by thP. end of this decade 
still are not foreseen to recover their peak levels achieved at the beginning of this decade. 
Trade War or Trade Policy? 
As the size of the export pie has stabilized, the conflicts over shares of the pie have 
sharpened. The most vocal disputes have been between the U.S. and the European Community over 
export subsidies, but conflicts have also arisen with Canada over pork trade and with Japan over 
market access for several commodities. Within the United States the growing commodity surplus 
problem and its rapidly rising cost to the federal treasury is creating political disputes 
between interest groups who would end agricultural price supports, leaving prices free to seek 
"competitive" levels, and those who seek an increase in price and income support. 
The lack of a clear and comprehensive U.S. policy on its agricultural trade has given rise 
to ad hoc approaches to the problem. Examples of these "trade war" options are discussed below, 
and some ideas about a "trade policy" approach are offered. 
Export Subsidies 
There has been much talk and some action in the direction of export subsidies to counter the 
subsidies of the EC and make them more costly. The latest of these ideas is the export PI K 
program where surplus commodities are used to subsidize the exports of the same commodity. 
Unlike a cash subsidy, the payment-in-kind has the effect of adding more grain to the market. It 
is not certain Uat this form of subsidy would enhance domestic market prices, as it increases 
market supplies. Even cash subsidies are of dubious value to a lar.ge exporter such as the United 
States. If such programs are limited to targeted markets they will have a negligible impact on 
total exports. If they are applied across the board, the costs could be prohibitive. Moreover, 
providing (at government expense) cheap feed to foreign livestock producers while keeping U.S. 
grain prices at a higher level is not likely to be a cost-effective means of improving U.S. farm 
income. 
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Retaliation 
Most of the recent export subsidy actions have been directed against the EC in retaliation 
for the export subsidy the community has routinely used. Aside from scoring political points on 
the homefront and antagonizing an ally, it is not clear that these actions have achieved anything. 
A little introspection should tell us that political pressure from outside the country is not 
likely to have much influence on domestic agricultural policy decisions. It is the domestic 
policies in the EC that create the need for export subsidies and other surplus disposal programs. 
Like the United States, the EC has been forced in recent years to review its domestic 
agricultural policies critically, because of the increasingly high cost of the programs. These 
pressures have brought about some reduction in the support levels for commodities as well as 
supply adjustment programs for dairy and wine production. 
High levels of price supports were relatively easy for the EC to continue as long as the 
community was a net importer. As a net exporter of some commodities, it finds itself under a 
different set of pressures that are beginning to have an effect on internal policy decisions. 
Nevertheless, we should not expect too much benefit to our trade if the community becomes more 
conservative. A recent study by Meyers, Thamodaran, and Helmar (1985) found that the slowing 
rate of income growth in importing areas of the world, and the appreciation of the U.S. dollar, 
had five times more impact on the value of U.S. exports than did the increasing level of support 
prices in the EC. Hence, while the domestic agricultural policy of the EC has had a negative 
effect on U.S. agriculture, it is not likely that a reversal of that policy would substantially 
improve the U.S. export performance. 
The United States and the EC face similar problems. Both have substantial surplus capacity 
which was brought on in part by policies that induced expansion of productive capacity and 
resources in agriculture. Both face serious adjustment problems in the years ahead and need to 
find ways to maintain a vital agricultural industry under increasingly difficult budget and 
market conditions. 
Trade Policy 
Having recognized the factors that have combined to stifle the growth in U.S. exports, we 
can outline the elements of a trade policy to address the problem. To affer.t the factors 
enumerated above requires a trade policy that goes beyond traditional agricultural policy 
boundaries. It needs to recognize that the major growth areils for agricultural exports in the 
future are the developing countries. Many of these potential markets are now choked with credit 
constraints, debt service problems, slow economic growth--one or all. Effective action to 
relieve the situation and facilitate trade requires not only a broadly based U.S. policy, but 
also collaboration with other developed countries. Although multilateral cooperation is always 
difficult, enlightened self-interest could motivate the EC, Canada, and Australia, for example, 
to cooperate. 
The primary thrust of the trade po 1 icy approach is to res tore effective demand growth for 
agricultural commodities. The instruments to increase the purchasing power in developing 
countries would include the macroeconomic policies of the United States and other developed 
countries, the credit policies of private and public institutions in the developed countries, the 
trade policies of developed countries toward the export goods of the developing countries, and 
economic development assistance. Based on past experience, it is likely that North-South trade 
will be much more effective than development assistance in achieving economic growth and 
development in the developing countries. 
Some of these initiatives are obviously long-term in nature, but credit and trade policies 
need not take a long time to have a significant effect on purchasing power. Such a trade policy 
approach recognizes once again that agriculture has become completely integrated into the 
domestic and international economies and relies heavily upon factors outside of agriculture to 
generate the growth that agriculture will need to remain a vital sector of the economy in the 
rest of this decade and beyond. 
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Conclusions 
The dramatic turnaround in agricultural exports of the 1980s was the result of numerous 
factors that combined to reduce the growth in world trade in the key agricultural commodities as 
well as the U.S. share of this trade. It is a fact of life for a major exporter such as the 
United States that export growth is dependent upon growth in total trade. To focus our energies 
and resources on trying to get a larger share of the shrinking pie is a wasteful endeavor. It is 
always easier for the small trader to win such battles. It is more difficult to formulate a more 
general, comprehensive trade policy to deal with the problem, yet that is a task that offers some 
hope for success. 
The conditions that have brought us to this point in the 1980s appear likely to continue for 
the rest of the decade. Grain export demand in the next five to ten years is expected to grow 
rather than decline, but growth is likely to be much slower than in the 1970s. Prospects for the 
United States and the EC and other exporting countries to reach agreements on cooperative 
production adjustment programs or negotiate market shares must be regarded as dim. However, 
there should exist a mutual interest in restoring effective demand for agricultural imports in 
the developing world. Current unilateral export expansion programs by individual countries are 
short-sighted in their focus on increasing market share and have little impact on increasing 
market size. 
A well conceived trade policy that would include improvement of credit conditions would be 
much more effective than the sum of the unilateral efforts that now exist. The real choice is 
between a comprehensive long term trade policy and a continuation of short-run ad hoc reactions 
to trade problems. 
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SUMMARY OF THE SEMINAR 
Harold D. Guither 
Policy Specialist, Extension Service, USDA and 
Professor of Agricultural Ec~nomics 
University of Illinois 
''Farm Policy - The Emerging Agenda" is certainly an appropriate theme. The first morning of this seminar dealt with agricultural finance and credit. It looked at the policies that have led 
us to where we are today, and the impact they have had. There was a recognition that one of the 
major problems with which we must deal is providing credit and other financing to agriculture. The challenge is to develop policies that accomplish the policy goals, not universally agreed 
upon, that we have for agriculture. There was inadequate discussion about what the credit and finance problems associated with declining land values may mean to the structure of land ownership in the United States. How we refinance agriculture will have an impact on who will ·gain control 
of land. 
As we look at both the short-term and long-term policies that we may ne~d to develop we may 
want to look at other industries and see if they provide any guidelines for us. Others have faced financial problems. Automobiles, steel, and electronics come to mind. In these industries we find few firms and a reduced worker force. We see evi dPnce of a number of products a·nd differentiated model of these products. Further, we see the application of new production technologies. Companies have certainly been restructuring in order to survive. We need to ask how and why did Chrysler and Continental Illinois first give up, and then get government help? We 
need to ask the ways in which agriculture is like these restructuring industries, and the ways it is different. 
In financing, will we move toward more equity financing and less debt? Will w~ devise 
cooperative equity ownership as we have credit cooperatives of the past? A look back at history 
will cause us to remember that a new credit system developed out of the needs of the 1930s. Will 
new eouity financing institutions develop in the 1980s in response to the present situation? 
Irrespective of what decisions are made, there seems to be no disagreement that a difficult transition period lies ahead. 
Overcapacity in Agriculture 
Overcapacity in agriculture was mentioned by several speakers. There seems to be consensus that it is part of the problem. But the question must be asked whether a policy or course of 
action to deal with it can be agreed on. Options offered were the following: 
1. Let the market dictate how we reduce capacity. 
2. Let the government allocate production rights. 
3. Initiate a joint farmer-financed effort, perhaps like that previously undertaken in dairy--and being considered again. 
4. Find new markets for the products of overcapacity. 
There was relatively little discussion about developing markets for the overcapacity, and in fact a consensus that opportunities are 1 imited in the short run unless the rate of economic growth here and in many parts of the world can be speeded up. 
Professor Raup pointed out that some approaches to overcapacity may not work as anticipated. For instance, reducing the number of farmers will not necessarily bring land out of production. The question has to be asked, what do we want? Do we want fewer big farms and, if we do, are we 
willing to accept the pub 1 i c programs t.ha t may be necessary? 
1 These comments are those of the speaker and should not b~ construed as representing views of 
either the United States Department of Agriculture or the University of Illinois. 
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International Dimension 
Dr. Learn and, later, Dr Meyers reminded of the international dimension of the problems we 
face. Everyone knows about our increased export sales in the 1970s and more recent decline. But 
have we addressed the policies needed to accommodate this new international dimension? If we fail 
to do that, we are likely to perpetuate policies that had their origin in the mainly domestic 
agricultural market of the 1960s. 
The point was made that the new international dimension is not consistent with the rise in 
protectionism that is sensed just now. This, of course, is an explanation why agricultural groups 
generally oppose import restrictions. 
International markets, growing competition abroad, economic growth abroad -- all these have 
implications for domestic policies that are now in place and those that may be proposed and 
adopted. We need policy unification bringing together many considerations that we have been 
trying to deal with separately. We need to expand total export demand, and one of the ways to do 
this is to expand total trade. It appears that we may have more luck in incr·easing the market 
size globally than in increasing our market share. It appears that it would certainly be a 
mistake to freeze ourselves into the policy of the past. Honey and tobacco are illustrations of 
the costly effects of not recognizing the increasing importance of the international market for 
agricultural products. 
Increasing Importance of Non-Farm Policies 
We spent considerable time at the seminar recognizing the fact that policies that do not come 
from usual USDA Congressional Agricultural Committee sources may be even more important than those 
that do. Certainly monetary and fiscal policies are part of the major cause of many farmers' 
financial problems. High interest rates, the high value of the dollar, and tax policies all 
impinge heavily upon the agricultural sector, but the policies that govern these do not arise in 
the traditional farm policy setting or sources. 
In 1984 in a 17 state survey, farmers said that they supported deficit reduction and even 
cuts in agricultural programs if all shared and we moved toward a balanced budget. Since the time 
these answers were given the financial crisis has become more severe and we find that many 
Congressmen are not willing to see any reduction in agricultural programs at this time. They even 
find it difficult to target programs in such a way that agricultural programs will help those who 
need it and not go to those who do not need help. 
Concern for the federal deficit raises very quickly the whole issue of targeting of benefits. 
Are we willing to target benefits? Yet, benefits cannot be targeted until decisions are made as 
to the purpose of farm programs and the role of government in agricultural policies. 
Professor Jolly tells us why the job of targeting is so difficult. He points out the wide 
range of situations in which farmers find themselves. This variation makes even more important 
the question of whether commodity support programs should be based on scale of business or upon 
financial need. 
An issue raised but not dealt with in detail here is the political difficulty involved in 
explaining that payments for reducing production must go to those with production potential 
regardless of their financial needs -- if a cutback in output is to be attained. Limitation of 
deficiency payments or price support loans is more feasible and can be targeted more readily to 
those with certain levels of financial need. 
Survival 
The conference produced an agreement, though reluctantly, that not all farmers will survive 
in farming. There was only brief discussion on policies to help those who cannot continue to 
farm. There are issues here that deserve further discussion. 
What role should policies have in deciding who will continue to farm? Do we wish to have 
policy in which three or four generations on the family farm will guarantee the right to continue 
that family on the farm? How many young persons can start farming today if their family has no 
land ownership or wealth with which they can acquire land? Are we going to head toward a policy 
of licensing farmers or develop some qualification test before they can start farming or obtain 
credit? 
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Lessons of History 
What can we learn from history? What is the difference between the present and some earlier 
times? Professor Philip Raup most appropriately pointed out that the situation in the 1980s bears 
some resemb 1 ance to the 1930s but that there are major differences too. He reminded us that insofar as causes are different in the two time periods, the solutions also may be very different 
today from those of 50 years ago. 
Other Issues 
The conference did not deal with a number of important issues as, for example, the 
relationship between short-term problems and their solution and what may be the long-term implications of the short-term solution. 
The conference did not deal with inequities among commodities. Soybeans, peanuts, sunflower 
seeds --all these have different policies, but all are oilseeds with human food products derived from them. Does this make sense? 
What about corn vs. wheat? Favoring one commodity can certainly affect the other. Should we freeze regional production relationships or should we recognize the interrelationships between 
these commodities? 
Look at the differences in corn and wheat and how they move. A major part of the corn market is domestic. As specialization increases, more and fllore corn moves from a farm to a feeding 
operation. Wheat is not primarily a feed grain . Thus we can find inequities in programs. An 
example is the 1983 PIK program which had such strong effects on the livestock industry. Sometimes these relationships are recognized. For instance, in the dairy title of the House Bill (1985 farm bill), in response to the livestock producers' complaint, purchase of an additional 250 
million pounds of red meat was authorized. 
We did not adequately face up to the problems of wide differences in the size and 
organization of farming operations. It is very difficult to resolve program benefit issues when programs are widely different. It is probably easier to achieve a degree of balance when only financial need is the basis for benefits, but even this is difficult. 
In the United States, to the average urban worker the financial data on agriculture look impressive. It is difficult to win concern for agriculture's problems. In a sense it is a matter 
of the difference between the farm household and the household plus the farm business. Do we need 
to explore ways to develop a business system that will separate the farm business from the farm family household? It is possible that family farming corporations may be able to do this to some 
extent. 
The conference did not discuss in detail the high costs of intergenerational land transfers. Can we develop a system that relieves this burden on each new generation of farmers and their families? Have we carefully explored the alternative patterns of land ownership and control? 
Have we appreciated the necessity for secure land tenure arrangements? I wondered whether Europe provides any lessons for us. Note I said lessons. not patterns or example. 
Do we already have a system of family landed gentry in America? Should we be concerned if 
new entrants, without farming background, want to farm? Should our policies make it possible for 
these people to get into agriculture or should agriculture be reserved only for those born to it? 
While persons at the seminar seemed to agree that readjustment was taking place in 
agriculture, they did not spend much time looking at the cost of land to rent and how the landowner is going to share with the renter in the readjustment that obviously is taking place. 
The conference did not deal with the extent to which there is need for more integration of farm production with value-added through marketing, processing, or some other way if family farm 
cash flow is to be improved. The conference almost completely ignored the impact of the present farm situation on the income and structure of rural communities. They are important issues. 
A Look Back and a Look Forward 
History tells us that farm numbers and farm population have declined for a long time. We know that we are going to continue to have research and extension programs that deal with those 
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who remain in agriculture as we have traditionally known it. But do we need more research and 
extension programs that emphasize how to help them to develop and maintain a new life that retains 
a connection with the rural community and the social values that rural people cherish? Should we be actively trying to make it possible for as many people to stay in the rural areas as possible? 
New policy ideas come and go. The marketing loan is a new concept that may need more time. It seems worthy of additional study. Perhaps it will be refined and modified through compromise 
and brought back later as an acceptable policy tool. 
For every policy implemented there is a consequence. Bruce Bullock gave us an excellent 
analysis of this. Do we look carefully enough at the consequences of the policies we adopt? 
How much domestic protection for U.S. agriculture is appropriate? In dairy production it 
seems fairly well accepted. In sugar it is more in question. Perhaps one of the reasons is that 
with corn sweeteners our need for domestic production for security is lessened. 
Technology is with us. New technologies will arise and not infrequently they will tend to 
change the regional patterns of production. How do we deal with this? Patterns of the past can be frozen to the detriment of other areas. Peanut quotas and tobacco quotas are examples. Do we 
want these to continue? The same questions can be asked of milk in the South. Does it make sense to shift production out of the Lake States? 
This conference failed to deal with changes in dietary habits. Food is not just food. Market demands are changing. What effect should these have upon our policies? 
A Parting Word 
In the seminar we dealt with some important issues. There was not time to deal with all of them. Much work is left to be done. The task is not complete. 
Farmers, agribusinessmen, and indeed all citizens need to be alert to the issues, the 
choices, and the consequences of the choices. The Breimyer Seminar and forums like it should help do that. Only knowledgeable, informed people can understand and make intelligent decisions. 
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